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Legal academics who call for campaign finance reform—let us call 
them “Reformers”—have overlooked the significance of race, and as a result 
their critiques of constitutional jurisprudence and reform proposals remain 
woefully incomplete.  Studies reveal that people of color comprise approx-
imately thirty percent of the nation’s population,1 but represent only about 
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one percent of those who make significant political contributions to federal 
campaigns.2  Issues of racial identity necessarily evoke questions of represen-
tation in the political process, and the qualitative nature of representation is 
in part a product of the laws and procedures that govern democracy.3  
Commentators, courts, and legislatures have extensively analyzed other 
facially race-neutral procedures that have historically excluded people of 
color from the political process, such as at-large electoral districts, poll taxes, 
and literacy tests,4 and they are beginning to analyze contemporary devices 
such as punch-card ballots.5  Although the doctrines and regulations 
governing the funding of campaigns are no less significant in shaping the 
racial distribution of political influence, the interplay between race and 
campaign finance remains largely unexamined.6 
 
ESTIMATES], available at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt 
(indicating that as of November 1, 2000, African Americans made up 12.8%, Hispanics 11.9%, 
Asian Americans 4.1%, and American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts 0.9% of the population of the 
United States). 
2. See John Green et al., Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, 
Conservative and Reform-Minded, Individual Donors and Campaign Finance, 1998 JOYCE 
FOUNDATION 13 (showing that, in a random survey of individuals who made reportable 
contributions (contributions of $200 or more), less than 1% of contributors surveyed identified 
themselves as people of color, whereas 95% identified themselves as white). 
3. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1, 2 (1998) (stating that “[t]he kind 
of democratic politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional forms and 
legal structures” which “limit and define the decisions available through democratic politics itself”); 
cf. DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xix (1995) (arguing that 
“[w]hat distinguishes an outstanding legal professional from an ordinary one in the field of election 
law is the ability to understand the details of legal regulations as they affect and at least aspire to 
benefit the democratic political system”); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging 
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2198 (1990) (observing that “[p]olitical institutions and decision procedures 
must create the conditions out of which . . . a political community can forge for itself a collective 
will” and “specify whose views will be counted in determining the collective will”). 
4. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341, 347 (1960) (invalidating municipal 
redistricting that fenced out of the city all but “four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not 
removing a single white voter or resident”); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965) (“The 
Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.”); Roy W. Copeland, The Status 
of Minority Voting Rights: A Look at Section V Preclearance Protections and Recent Decisions 
Affecting Multi-Member Voting Districts, 28 HOW. L.J. 417, 418 (1985) (citing Justice Black’s 
opinion in Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 151 (1965), which stated that “Louisiana’s 
interpretation test, as written and as applied, was part of a successful plan to deprive Louisiana 
Negroes of their right to vote”); Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal 
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 735 (1998) (“By the early 
1900s, a majority of states with large populations of freedmen had adopted poll taxes that 
effectively eliminated many potential African-American voters from the polls.”). 
5. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2001) (using race as a lens to examine the decision to disregard thousands 
of imperfectly perforated punch-card ballots in Florida following the 2000 presidential election). 
6. Four recent works regarding campaign finance, all of which primarily analyze policy issues 
related to legislative proposals rather than constitutional jurisprudence, should be noted.  See Terry 
Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1469 (2001) (examining the difference 
between the meaning of political equality for whites and for people of color, and explaining that 
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This Article employs race to expose fundamental shortcomings of 
existing campaign finance jurisprudence and to promote the development of 
more comprehensive reforms.  Current campaign finance jurisprudence and 
the critiques made by the Reformers are founded upon normative assump-
tions about democracy that ignore important historical and social realities 
related to race.  Existing frameworks fail to acknowledge that past state-
mandated discrimination against racial minorities has shaped the current 
distribution of property, which in turn hinders the ability of many people of 
color to participate fully in a privately financed political system. 
By using the First Amendment to undermine legislative restrictions on 
the use of political money, courts effectively enshrine the existing 
distribution of property as a baseline for political advantage.  This situation is 
especially troubling because courts generally allow for legislative restrictions 
that redistribute advantages in the economic sphere, and voting rights 
doctrine often mandates racial inclusion and equality in the political sphere.7  
In addition, class-based legislative reform proposals sometimes inadvertently 
thwart the interests of people of color.  An exclusively class-based approach 
to reform is inadequate because race operates as a distinct political identity 
worthy of independent analysis in the campaign finance context.  Racial 
minorities play an important political role in democracy that transcends their 
class interests.8  The Reformers’ failure to examine race prevents them from 
fully identifying and rectifying the flaws in the current campaign finance 
 
legislative reforms such as higher contribution limits and the continued use of soft money may be 
less inclusive of people of color); Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Campaign Finance Reform, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1523 (2001) (asserting that proposed reform legislation might hinder black political 
advancement); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Finance, Race, and Equality, 79 N.C. L. REV. 
1535 (2001) (supporting an increase in hard money contribution limits in order to make it easier for 
politicians to raise campaign finance money, and asserting that this proposal advances good 
government for all citizens, regardless of race); Jason P. Conti, Note, The Forgotten Few: 
Campaign Finance Reform and Its Impact on Minority and Female Candidates, 22 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 99 (2002) (arguing that legislative reforms such as banning soft money contributions, 
lowering PAC contribution limits, and raising hard money contribution limits hurt minority 
candidates, whereas public financing helps minority candidates).  While the above commentators 
consider race in examining legislative proposals to reform campaign finance, this Article considers 
race in examining the constitutional doctrine affecting campaign finance.  See infra Parts II–IV.  
Part V of this Article also addresses legislative reforms by explaining the divergence of the above 
commentators’ opinions. 
7. See infra subpart IV(A). 
8. Cf. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: 
Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 191 (1994) (“The race 
of the voters matters in North Carolina precisely because the black voters have voted consistently 
against the racial politics of North Carolina’s Congressional Club and Republican Party.”); Lani 
Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 130 (1994) 
(observing that “minority group representation . . . has a political component” and that “[g]roup 
members may identify collectively along a common axis and organize to promote common interests 
in ways similar to other political associations”); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, 
Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 697 (1996) (asserting that “[i]dentity politics have been 
crucial and perhaps inevitable responses to perceived oppressions”). 
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system, and thus subtracts from the utility of both their critiques of 
constitutional jurisprudence and their legislative reform proposals. 
Though some assert that decisionmakers should not consider race in a 
“colorblind” society,9 such a consideration need not entail the employment of 
a “race card” that trumps all other matters and singularly insists on race-
specific solutions.  Instead, just as scholars and legal decisionmakers bal-
ance such concerns as individual rights, economic efficiency, and general 
welfare,10 they can use race as one analytical tool in conjunction with other 
factors.  A consideration of racial history and context allows scholars and 
legal decisionmakers to avoid the pitfalls of the “colorblind card,” an ideo-
logical extreme that mechanically trumps historical considerations, removes 
relevant issues from the table, and silences discussion. 
Part II of the Article reviews understandings about democracy that 
Reformers and supporters of current campaign finance jurisprudence tend to 
emphasize.  In arriving at divergent conclusions about the definition of a 
well-functioning democracy, the groups prioritize dissimilar values and make 
different assumptions about the realities of politics. 
Part III discusses relevant, but previously overlooked, political realities 
related to race.  While the Reformers correctly observe that property is dis-
tributed unevenly, they do not acknowledge that this uneven distribution 
arises in part from illegitimate factors such as past state-sponsored racial 
discrimination, or that racial disparities in property distribution are reflected 
in political participation in the current campaign finance system. 
Part IV broadens the reform perspective to consider these racial realities 
in the political-money context.  This expanded analysis allows for two fresh 
critiques that reveal how seemingly neutral campaign finance doctrine 
contributes to current racial disparities in political access and leads to future 
racial disparities in the political distribution of societal resources. 
Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence 
is only a part of the problem, Part V explores how political decisionmakers 
should consider race in analyzing legislative reforms.  Individuals can harbor 
conflicting opinions about the racial impact of a single reform.  These varied 
outlooks stem from different empirical and normative assumptions about the 
importance of various objectives that sometimes conflict, such as the poli-
tical mobilization of voters of color, the accountability of political officials 
and parties to people of color, and the election of people of color to political 
 
9. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that “our Constitution is color-blind”).  But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (noting that “no decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the 
Constitution must be colorblind”). 
10. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 279–82 
(1997) (describing the use of various policy considerations as analytical tools in lawmaking). 
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office.  A sophisticated policy analysis requires a judgment as to the relative 
importance of each objective, and an understanding of the extent to which a 
single legislative proposal furthers particular objectives and hinders other 
objectives. 
II. Existing Democratic Understandings Regarding Campaign Finance 
Some commentators have observed that judicial rulings on disputes 
regarding the law of the political process are influenced by judges’ differing 
assumptions about how democracy works or should work.11  Likewise, those 
who argue for changes in the laws that govern campaign finance and those 
who defend the status quo rely on differing visions of politics that are all 
descriptively and normatively contestable.12  Decisions about campaign 
finance depend on decisionmakers’ thoughts about whether a well-
functioning democracy relies on integrity, widespread participation and 
input, reasoned deliberation, prevention of entrenchment, exchange un-
fettered by government, or other characteristics.13  Campaign finance 
decisions are also influenced by empirical assumptions and historical inter-
pretations used by decisionmakers to determine how the characteristics listed 
above should be realized in a particular cultural context.14  These different 
 
11. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: 
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1989) (observing that with regard to “issues soaked with 
political interest . . . legal argument and judicial explanation . . . unselfconsciously reflect 
underlying assumptions about actual and potential social relations, and about the institutional 
arrangements and forms of political life fit for those relations as they are and are capable of 
becoming”); cf. Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Recounts: Form and the Law of 
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2002) (observing that one’s assumptions about 
democracy shape one’s preference for using rules or standards to allocate discretion in the 
regulation of politics). 
12. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (contending that “once the case for reform is 
understood to rest on a descriptively and normatively contestable vision of politics, we will be in a 
better position to discuss both the attractiveness of particular proposals for reform and the limits of a 
reform strategy”); William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 335, 376 (2000) (finding that “[d]emocracy does not have an ideal archetype” and 
thus “the case for [campaign finance] reform must be tempered by the awareness that there is no 
clear guidepost from which to evaluate whether democracy is, or is not, working”). 
13. See Michelman, supra note 11, at 444 (observing that disagreements in political cases often 
depend on different “normative conception[s] of democratic politics”); Mark Rush, The Law of 
Democracy, 5 LAW & POL. BOOK REV. 239, 244 (1998) (stating that “the controversies that inhere 
in electoral process case law really have everything to do with the conflicting strains of democratic 
theory and, in reality, little to do with the inconsistencies of jurisprudence”); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the apportionment case required the 
court to “choose among competing bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing 
theories of political philosophy—in order to establish an appropriate frame of government”). 
14. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001) 
(describing judicial culture as “the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, and normative 
ideals of democracy that seem to inform and influence the current constitutional law of 
democracy”). 
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approaches to campaign finance are not necessarily more democratic or less 
democratic, but address and prioritize different concerns, values, and 
experiences.  The approaches therefore provide for democracy and expres-
sion by employing different characteristics and qualities.15  In other words, 
the debate about campaign finance is not a simple choice about where to 
draw the line between individual expression and democracy.  Instead, cam-
paign finance involves substantive choices about the character, quality, and 
meaning of democracy, as well as similar choices about individual 
expression and other instruments used in securing one’s definition of a well-
functioning democracy.16  This Part reviews the distinct values and realities 
that Reformers, critics of Reformers, and supporters of current campaign 
finance jurisprudence emphasize. 
A. Democratic Understandings of Current Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence 
In Buckley v. Valeo,17 the United States Supreme Court relied on its 
understanding about the importance of money in modern elections to derail 
attempts to restrict political spending.  Buckley involved a challenge to con-
tribution and spending limitations contained in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (the “1974 Act”),18 which, among other 
things, prohibited individuals from contributing more than $1000 to a can-
didate for federal office.19  The 1974 Act also contained an array of 
expenditure limitations, including provisions that limited the amounts that 
 
15. Cf. David A. Strauss, What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 141, 141–42 (asserting that the varied arguments in favor of reform “in fact reflect unease 
about the underlying tensions in democratic theory—for example, concern that representatives are 
too responsive to their constituents, or concern that groups with greater access to resources have 
undue influence”). 
16. Cf. James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political 
Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 897 (1997) (stating that 
“[w]e can hardly expect to figure out what voting—or ‘fair’ voting, or ‘meaningful’ voting—means 
without some conception of what voting is for, what purpose it serves within a larger regime of 
democratic self-government”); Marshall, supra note 12, at 375–76 (observing that the various goals 
of campaign finance reform often conflict and that the “fact that the types of harms to the political 
process are so varied means that there is little likelihood that a solution could be crafted that 
addresses all these concerns”); Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic 
Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1996) (complaining that 
“reform efforts are based on faulty assumptions” about how the reformist believes democracy 
works, and therefore reform proposals “inherently favor certain political elites, support the status 
quo, and discourage grassroots political activity”). 
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(repealed 1976). 
19. Specifically, the 1974 Act prohibited an individual from giving more than $1000 to a 
particular candidate per election, see 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976, 
recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A)), and limited an individual’s overall contributions to $25,000 
per year, see 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976, recodified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(a)(3)). 
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could be spent by a campaign, by a candidate from her personal funds, and 
by a noncandidate on behalf of a candidate.20 
The Court in Buckley applied high First Amendment scrutiny to the 
restrictions based on its own understanding about the realities of politics.  In 
its analysis, the Court focused primarily on the culturally specific reality that 
“television, radio, and other mass media” were “indispensable instruments of 
effective political speech.”21  According to the Court’s understanding of 
contemporary politics and private markets, the need to purchase airtime or 
newspaper space from private media outlets made “the raising of large sums 
of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy.”22  The 
Court believed spending money to be so important to effective political 
speech that a restriction on spending money effectively constituted a restric-
tion on speech.23  The Court’s recognition of the reality that spending was 
closely related to speech prompted it to reject the argument that the need to 
equalize political opportunities justified limitations on spending, reasoning 
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment.”24  Consequently, the Court invalidated 
spending restrictions.25 
 
20. The expenditure-limitation provisions were as follows: (1) a $1000 annual ceiling on 
independent expenditures (expenditures by a noncandidate to promote the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate), see 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976); (2) an 
annual ceiling on campaign expenditures from a candidate’s personal or family funds, see id. 
§ 608(a)(1); and (3) a variable ceiling on total campaign expenditures from all sources, see id. 
§ 608(c).  This Article is limited to a discussion of the portion of the 1974 Act concerning campaign 
contributions and expenditures.  Buckley also invalidated regulatory provisions providing for the 
appointment of some FEC commissioners by congressional leaders (based on the separation-of-
powers doctrine), Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138–41, but upheld disclosure, see id. at 60–84, and public-
financing provisions, see id. at 85–109.  For important literature providing additional information on 
Buckley and the campaign finance dilemma generally, see ANTHONY CORRADO, CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE REFORM (2000); ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 3, at 616–64; 
LOWENSTEIN, supra note 3, at 507–44 (1995); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, 
ELECTION LAW: SUPPLEMENT 2000–2001, 77–127 (2000); and E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY 
STOPS HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (1998). 
21. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
22. Id. at 26. 
23. See id. at 26; see also id. at 18 n.17 (asserting that “the Act’s dollar ceilings restrict[ed] the 
extent of the reasonable use of virtually every means of communicating information”) (emphasis 
added).  A number of commentators have interpreted Buckley as equating money with speech.  See, 
e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1277 (1994); Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who’s Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 370 (1995); 
Alan B. Morrison, What If . . . Buckley Were Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 347, 369–70 
(1999).  Contrary to popular opinion, Buckley’s initial application of speech doctrine to regulations 
of political money is not based on the logic that “money is speech” (i.e., that spending is the same 
thing as speaking).  Rather, Buckley’s application of speech doctrine was premised on the rationale 
that money is so important to “effective political speech” that a restriction on spending money 
effectively constituted a restriction on speech. 
24. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
25. See id. at 47–48. 
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In contrast, the Court upheld the $1000 contribution limit.  The Court 
made the context-specific assessment that the contribution limit was suf-
ficiently high so as not to interfere with the ability of candidates to engage in 
effective advocacy26 and that such a limit was needed to prevent corruption 
and the appearance of corruption.27  Such a judgment relies on certain 
assumptions about economic and political realities, such as what constitutes 
effective advocacy; how much effective advocacy costs; how large con-
tributions must be to allow candidates to raise enough money to engage in 
effective advocacy; and at what point contributions are so large that they 
invite corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
A group of scholars who are generally critical of the Reformers—
hereinafter referred to as the “Formalists”—agree with Buckley’s invalidation 
of spending limitations, but many would go a step further and invalidate 
contribution limitations.28  According to the Formalists’ understanding of 
political reality, both contributions and spending are essential to purchasing 
speaking opportunities in modern democracy, and thus a limitation on either 
constitutes a limitation on speech.29  Furthermore, Formalists observe that 
approaches that restrict contributions are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
prevent corruption.30  Formalists also articulate concerns that incumbent 
legislators will design campaign finance regulations so as to entrench 
themselves31 and that such regulations may have unintended consequences.32 
 
26. See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (asking whether a 
contribution limit was so low as to “impede the ability of candidates to ‘amas[s] the resources 
necessary for effective advocacy’” and “render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a 
candidate’s voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless” (quoting Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 21 (brackets in original))).  In Nixon, the Court explicitly reviewed contribution limits 
using a standard of scrutiny that was more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but “different” from 
the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits.  See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 385–87. 
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–29. 
28. See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom, 33 AKRON L. 
REV. 7, 35 (1999) (observing that those associated with the ACLU would “raise or even repeal all 
limits on campaign contributions or expenditures”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign 
Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 315 (observing that if the holding in Buckley was 
mistaken, “it should be corrected not by finding expenditure limits constitutional, but by finding 
First Amendment reasons to deregulate contributions”); cf. James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits 
on Campaign Contribution Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 235, 237 (1998) (“Contribution limits 
adversely affect our system of representative government by restricting the resources available for 
political dialogue.”). 
29. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 640 (1996) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “unlike the Buckley Court, I believe 
that contribution limits infringe as directly and as seriously upon freedom of political expression 
and association as do expenditure limits”). 
30. See D. Bruce LaPierre, Raising a New First Amendment Hurdle for Campaign Finance 
“Reform,” 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217, 225 (1998) (asserting that Buckley allowed “Congress to limit 
political contributions without any evidence that contributions in any particular amounts in excess 
of $1000 caused the harms, corruption, or the appearance of corruption, that inspired the 
restriction”). 
31. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1080 (1985) (“Contribution limitations . . . 
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B. Democratic Understandings Embraced by Reformers 
Reformers claim that the Court in Buckley and the Formalists overlook 
important values and political realities.  Various Reformers emphasize dif-
ferent normative concerns about democracy, including the adverse impact of 
the current campaign finance system on voter turnout, the recruitment of 
good candidates, the quality of campaign discourse, the integrity of 
government, the time that incumbent candidates devote to governing, and 
grass-roots campaigning.33  Though not all Reformers agree on a uniform 
analytical approach or a single reform proposal, identifiable themes appear 
throughout the scholarship of many Reformers.  The most important of these 
themes relate to equality, the relative nature of rights, the uneven distribution 
of property, and the role of campaign finance in the larger political process. 
While the Court in Buckley rejected equalization as a sufficiently 
worthwhile justification for spending restrictions,34 Reformers put equality 
back on the table.35  Some Reformers describe the intrinsic equality of human 
 
probably increasingly insulate incumbents from changing political opinion in and strong challenges 
from their local constituencies.”); Smith, supra note 16, at 1072 (“Contribution limits tend to favor 
incumbents by making it harder for challengers to raise money and thereby make credible runs for 
office.  The lower the contribution limit, the more difficult it becomes for a candidate to raise 
money quickly from a small number of dedicated supporters.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political 
Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 686 (1997) (observing that 
“[c]ampaign finance limits themselves may help to entrench incumbents in office” because 
challengers’ “lack of prominence may make it more difficult for them to raise funds from large 
numbers of small donations”). 
32. See Michael J. Malbin, Looking Back at the Future of Campaign Finance Reform: Interest 
Groups and American Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FINANCING 
ELECTIONS IN THE 1980S, at 232, 238–43 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984) (discussing the 
unanticipated consequences of campaign finance legislation); BeVier, supra note 31, at 1079–80 
(citing examples of how reforms have failed to achieve their goals); Bradley A. Smith, Some 
Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598 (1999) 
(observing the “propensity of campaign finance regulation to be particularly prone to the law of 
unintended consequences”); Sullivan, supra note 31, at 687–88 (discussing unintended 
consequences of campaign finance legislation); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and 
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1400 (1994) (acknowledging that, despite 
need for reform, regulation sometimes has unintended consequences). 
33. See Vincent Blasi, Spending Limits and the Squandering of Candidates’ Time, 6 J.L. & 
POL’Y 123, 123 (1997) (stating that fundraising diverts the time and energy officials need to do their 
jobs); Marshall, supra note 12, at 359–61 (describing normative problems within the political 
system that favor reform); Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 323, 328 
(“[C]andidates without ties to wealth are deterred from entering the electoral process . . . .”); cf. 
Strauss, supra note 15, at 141 (observing that one cannot determine whether campaign finance 
reform is needed, and what reforms might be in order, until one identifies “what the objective of any 
reform effort should be”). 
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (“The ancillary interest in equalizing the 
relative financial resources . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the . . . infringement of 
fundamental First Amendment rights.”). 
35. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 97–98 (1993) 
(criticizing the Court’s rejection of equality as justification for campaign finance reform); Burt 
Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
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beings as an important democratic norm or constitutional goal.36  Others 
explicitly invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that campaign finance 
is best understood as an equal-protection problem, rather than as solely a 
First Amendment problem.37  Reformers broadly state that citizens should 
enjoy sufficiently equal opportunities in persuading others during the 
argumentative stage of the electoral process,38 in participating in public 
elections as voters and candidates,39 and in influencing the outcome of 
political decisions.40 
Equality concerns are related to the second theme prevalent in Reformer 
scholarship—the relational nature of rights.  Reformers argue that the 
Buckley Court should have acknowledged not only the formal individual 
rights of spenders and contributors but also the rights of those without 
 
1055, 1057  (1999) (“Unless and until political equality re-enters the picture as a permissible reform 
goal, I see no way out of the current, unsatisfactory situation.  I believe that the Buckley Court was 
unduly hasty in taking equality entirely off the table as a justification for restricting runaway 
campaign spending.”); Nicholson, supra note 33, at 327–40 (arguing for giving great weight to 
equalization as a justification for campaign finance reform). 
36. See Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principal of Campaign 
Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994) (“In thinking about distributive justice, I start with 
the basic premise that all persons have equal intrinsic worth, which I call the principle of intrinsic 
equality.”); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1392–93 (“In democratic politics, a norm of equality is 
important: disparities in wealth ought not lead to disparities in power over government.”). 
37. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of 
Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1164 (1994) [hereinafter Raskin & 
Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative] (arguing that campaign finance “is best formulated in terms of 
equal protection rather than in the rarified and abstracted language of free speech”); see also Jamin 
Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 
279 (1993) [hereinafter Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection] (declaring that “[t]he purpose of this 
Article is to demonstrate that the current campaign finance regime is inconsistent with equal 
protection or, at the very least, warrants congressional action to vindicate equal protection”). 
38. See Foley, supra note 36, at 1227 (stating that “a citizen does not have equal input in the 
electoral process if she is denied an equal opportunity to participate in the argumentative stage of 
the process”). 
39. See Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice 
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1996) (asserting that 
“[e]galitarian pluralism aims to equalize the ability of different individuals to affect the political 
process” and is based on the notion that “disparities in wealth and ability to organize are not 
relevant to the individual’s right to influence political outcomes”); Raskin & Bonifaz, 
Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1164 (“Specifically, equal protection requires an 
inquiry into whether all citizens enjoy sufficient equality in the political field to participate 
meaningfully in public elections as voters, speakers, and candidates whenever they so desire.”); 
David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 
1382–85 (1994) (asserting those who have money should not be allowed to exert greater influence 
over the political process through their contributions); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1392 (listing 
political equality as a justification for campaign finance reform because “[t]he ‘one person-one 
vote’ rule exemplifies the commitment to political equality” and because “[l]imits on campaign 
expenditures are continuous with that rule”). 
40. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 327 (1993) (stating that the “fair value” of the 
political liberties requires that each citizen have “approximately equal, or at least sufficiently 
equal,” opportunities to “influence the outcome of political decisions”). 
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resources.41  Democracy, it is argued, requires more than the consideration of 
individual rights in a vacuum—democracy demands an understanding of the 
relative nature of all participants’ rights.42  In rejecting Buckley’s 
oversimplified notion of “rights,” which focuses on the individual interests of 
contributors and spenders, the Reformers take into account the varied 
interests of all citizens.43  Reformers assert that democracy has an interest not 
only in protecting formal political liberties from interference by government 
but also in taking steps to ensure that political liberties are real and 
meaningful to citizens who might otherwise lack the resources to enjoy their 
liberties.44 
Reformers assert that a mechanical protection of the individual rights of 
those with resources overlooks important First Amendment structural 
concerns.  Some argue that democracy needs campaign finance reform to 
advance a primary purpose of freedom of speech—attainment of well-
functioning speech markets that feature robust public debate from a variety 
of perspectives.45  Some campaign finance reform, Reformers argue, 
advances the First Amendment by promoting meaningful and diverse 
political deliberation that includes all social groups.46  Reformers do not use 
 
41. See Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1165 (“The key First 
Amendment issue at stake in this debate is not the right of the wealthy to spend up to the heavens, 
but the right of all citizens, poor and wealthy alike, to speak and participate meaningfully in the 
electoral process.”). 
42. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 404 (observing that “public expansion or contraction of rights is 
really an issue of relations of power between private individuals” and that a legal realist approach 
allows for a reinterpretation of First Amendment law “in terms of private power and 
subordination”). 
43. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(arguing for a new approach of judicial review to campaign finance regulations, stating that “where 
a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways—the 
Court has . . . refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality,” 
and has instead balanced interests). 
44. RAWLS, supra note 40, at 327 (explaining that “the first principle of justice [should include] 
the guarantee . . . that the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or 
economic position, [is] approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone 
has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the outcome of political decisions”); see 
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1390 (“Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring not only that 
political liberties exist as a formal and technical matter, but also that those liberties have real value 
to the people who have them.”). 
45. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 
255, 267 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992) (“[I]n some circumstances, what seems to be 
government regulation of speech actually might promote free speech, and should not be treated as 
an abridgement at all. . . .  [Further] what seems to be free speech in markets might, in some 
selected circumstances, amount to an abridgement of free speech.”). 
46. See Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1168 (“The political 
dialogue protected by the First Amendment is central to the project of democratic self-government, 
a principle recognized—but then badly distorted—by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.”); 
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1392 (“Campaign finance laws might promote the goal of ensuring 
political deliberation and reason-giving.  Politics should not simply register existing preferences and 
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words like “wealth,” “class,” “rich,” or “poor” merely to describe economic 
status; often they also use these words to describe political identity, 
acknowledging that poor citizens might articulate different political priorities 
than rich citizens.47  Absent reform, “the quality and breadth of political 
communication and debate suffer,”48 and government officials might make 
decisions based on private interest rather than on reasoned political 
deliberation.49 
Owen Fiss, for example, argues that some restrictions on political 
money may prevent a distortion of public debate and advance a more 
democratic understanding of the First Amendment.50  Campaign finance 
reform that benefits poorer candidates may advance First Amendment 
interests if it is designed to enhance the information available to the 
electorate.51  Admittedly, such reform might give greater benefits to poorer 
candidates, but privately financed elections also lack neutrality because they 
benefit wealthier candidates over others, and the existing distribution of 
financial resources need not be the constitutional baseline.52 
 
their intensities, especially as these are measured by private willingness to pay . . . .  [P]olitics has 
an important deliberative function.  The constitutional system aspires to a form of ‘government by 
discussion.’”). 
47. See Owen Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2470, 2480 (1997) (“Relying upon 
private wealth to finance public elections, even if it is the candidates’ own money, thus has two 
unwelcome effects on politics: it prevents voters from hearing certain perspectives, and it prevents 
some would-be participants in the political process from effectively airing their views.”); Neuborne, 
supra note 35, at 1072 (“A campaign financing system driven by extreme wealth disparity will 
inevitably reflect the needs and concerns of the persons who pay for the system, and it will ignore 
the needs and concerns of persons who lack the means to participate in the funding process. . . .  
This means that issues of importance to the holders of great wealth are more likely to find 
themselves on the agenda than issues of importance to the poor.”); Raskin & Bonifaz, 
Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1189 (“Moreover, the electoral system is closed not to 
random groups of citizens but specifically to less-affluent groups, who enjoy reduced access to the 
means of candidacy, the political process and government.  With whole sectors of the population 
marginalized in the electoral process, the quality and breadth of political communication and debate 
suffer.”). 
48. Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1189. 
49. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1392 (“Grants of cash to candidates might compromise that 
goal by, for example, encouraging legislatures to vote in accordance with private interest rather than 
reasons.”). 
50. See Fiss, supra note 47, at 2479 (asserting that an expenditure regulation “might be 
defended . . . on the ground that it prevents a distortion of public debate” and that such a regulation 
is “rooted in a democratic understanding of the First Amendment”). 
51. See id. at 2480 (“But if its justification were to enhance the information available to the 
electorate, as indeed might be the case with expenditure limits, there would be no breach of the 
requisite neutrality.”). 
52. See id. at 2481.  As Fiss points out: 
Admittedly, any system of public financing will favor some candidates or would-be 
candidates over others and in that sense be non-neutral.  But so would a system that 
relied on private wealth.  It too favors some candidates over others, since some have 
the money needed and others do not; yet, there is no reason to privilege that 
arrangement and to treat it as the constitutional baseline. 
Id. 
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Jack Balkin and Cass Sunstein observe that the inequities in political 
participation under the current campaign finance system arise directly from a 
preexisting unequal distribution of property.53  The government, they note, 
has created a system of property laws that makes inequalities in property 
possible.54  Thus, the government is responsible for the political advantages 
that some actors enjoy under the current campaign finance system.55 
Just as Reformers realize that mechanical applications of First 
Amendment doctrine to campaign finance are unwarranted, they also 
recognize that campaign finance is an essential component of the larger 
political process.56  Voting, some Reformers argue, is only one part of the po-
litical process,57 and full and meaningful political participation requires more 
than the grant of a formal vote.58  This more comprehensive understanding 
 
53. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 379.  Balkin explains further: 
One could argue that free speech in a situation of radically unequal economic power is 
not free speech at all because it is skewed by the preexisting distribution of 
property. . . .  The long term effect of the unequal distribution of power and property is 
an unequal exposure of particular ideas, and the stifling and co-opting of more radical 
and imaginative ideas about politics and society. 
Id. 
54. See id. at 414 (“The government is responsible for inequalities in access to the means of 
communication because it has created the system of property rights that makes such inequalities 
possible.”); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1399 (“[E]lections based on existing distributions of wealth 
and entitlements also embody a regulatory system, made possible and constituted through law.  
Here as elsewhere, law defines property interests; it specifies who owns what, and who may do 
what with what is owned.”). 
55. See Balkin, supra note 42, at 414 (“[I]t is not only wrong but also incoherent for opponents 
of campaign finance reform to contend that the government should not regulate access to the 
political process.  Government already regulates access to the political process—the first 
amendment simply demands that it do so fairly.  At the very least the first amendment should not 
act as a barrier to attempts to ensure that the process works equitably.”); Sunstein, supra note 32, at 
1399 (“Efforts to redress economic inequalities, or to ensure that they are not turned into political 
inequalities, should not be seen as impermissible redistribution, or as the introduction of 
government regulation into a place where it did not exist before.  A system of unlimited campaign 
expenditures should be seen as a regulatory decision to allow disparities in resources to be turned 
into disparities in political influence.”). 
56. Cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (1999) 
(“[S]hifting the lens through which we view campaign finance from the right to free speech to the 
right to participate highlights completely different issues.  It radically transforms the terms of the 
debate, but does not necessarily settle it.”). 
57. See Foley, supra note 36, at 1226.  Foley divides the electoral process into three stages: 
Voting is only the final stage of the electoral process.  It is preceded not only by the 
agenda-formation stage (in which matters to be voted upon are identified) but also by 
what might be called the ‘argumentative stage,’ in which competing factions of the 
electorate attempt to persuade the mass of undecided voters to agree with their 
positions. 
Id. 
58. See Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 300–01 (“When citizens of 
modest means go to the polls, they are voting for candidates whose political seriousness has been 
determined by a money-gathering process which, by definition, systematically demotes their 
interests. . . .  [T]hey are part of an electoral system ‘arranged in a manner that will consistently 
degrade’ their influence ‘on the political process as a whole.’” (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
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appreciates the importance of a well-functioning democratic structure59 and 
finds fault with the systemic disparities in power that private wealth brings to 
the political process.60 
Burt Neuborne, for example, proposes a “democracy-centered” reading 
of the First Amendment, which views the constitutional provision “not only 
as a protector of individual autonomy, but also as the structural guarantor of 
a fair democratic process.”61  To Neuborne, the First Amendment not only 
protects individual autonomy from democracy but also protects democracy 
from harmful autonomy.62  Collective decisionmaking is not necessarily best 
realized through the protection of individual First Amendment rights.  
Neuborne asserts that the First Amendment prioritizes campaign finance 
reforms that benefit democracy over a judicial mandate of unlimited 
spending that impairs democracy.63 
In contrast to the Formalists’ perception that money is analogous to 
speech in the political process, Reformers often use analogies to voting and 
borrow language from the voting rights and reapportionment contexts to 
emphasize the role of money in the political process.64  For example, a 
structural critique by Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz describes an existing 
campaign finance process in which wealthy contributors preselect almost all 
viable candidates (a process Raskin and Bonifaz deem the “wealth 
 
U.S. 109, 132 (1986))); see also S. REP. NO. 97–117, at 19 (1982) (“There is more to the right to 
vote than the right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever in a 
voting booth . . . .” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 (1964))), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 196. 
59. See Neuborne, supra note 35, at 1058 (“Viewed solely as a means of disabling government, 
a purely ‘autonomy-centered’ First Amendment can be affirmatively hostile to democracy by 
insulating private activity from regulation despite its deleterious effect on democracy.”). 
60. See, e.g., id. at 1072 (“[W]ealth disparity introduces massive political inequality skewed to 
a predictable set of self-interested positions. . . .  For the same reasons we rejected property 
qualifications for voting and running for office . . . we should be extremely concerned with a set of 
institutional decisions that creates massive wealth-driven disparities in political power.”); Balkin, 
supra note 42, at 414 (“[W]e should isolate the egalitarian assumptions implicit in the ‘money is not 
speech’ position and put them to their best use—the justification of campaign finance reforms on 
the grounds that ‘gross inequalities’ of economic power destroy the integrity of the political 
process.”). 
61. Neuborne, supra note 35, at 1059. 
62. See id. at 1068 (“[T]he question arises whether other possible visions exist that might 
supplant, or at least supplement, the traditional autonomy model.  One such vision is to insist that 
the First Amendment’s role is not solely to protect autonomy against democracy, but also to enable 
and protect democracy against harmful autonomy.”). 
63. See id. at 1070 (“Read as a bulwark of democracy (as well as a protection of individual 
autonomy), the First Amendment tells us that, when more than one candidate for First Amendment 
autonomy protection exists in a democracy case, the Court should privilege behavior that benefits 
democracy rather than behavior that saps its vitality.”). 
64. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 36, at 1220 (“To give the rich more votes than the poor just 
because they are rich would be a form of elitism in violation of the principle of intrinsic equality.  
The interests of poor citizens must count the same as the interests of rich citizens.”). 
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primary”).65  This practice does not leave the political process equally open; 
instead, it denies voters meaningful electoral choice66 and degrades their 
“influence on the political process as a whole.”67  Raskin and Bonifaz also 
argue that large out-of-state contributions work to “dilute the zealous 
independent representation of the people of each state . . . by making elected 
officials more accountable to the nationalized interests of specific wealthy 
groups and industries.”68  Similarly, out-of-district contributions offend one-
person, one-vote principles by expanding the political power of wealthier 
districts and reducing the power of poorer districts.69  Raskin and Bonifaz 
criticize the existing campaign finance system not only for the inequitable 
access it provides to potential candidates and voters70 but also for the 
structural bias in government decisionmaking that results.71 
 
65. See Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 287.  The authors identify 
several features of the federal campaign process: 
[E]xorbitant costs that effectively freeze out poorer candidates, stack the deck in favor 
of candidates backed by wealth and incumbency, and reduce electoral choice; an 
almost invisible network of public and private campaign subsidies to incumbents; the 
critical role of private money in producing (and predicting) electoral victory; and a 
process increasingly dominated by wealth in ways that systematically discourage full 
political dialogue, participation, and competition. 
Id. 
66. See id. at 280 (asserting that the effect of the wealth primary is that it “sharply reduces voter 
choice”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (protecting minority racial groups from electoral 
systems that afford them “less opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice”). 
67. Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 279–80 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 
478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986), which found that partisan gerrymandering violates equal protection when 
“the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of 
voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”). 
68. Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 306. 
69. See id. (arguing that “the constitutional principles of one person/one vote and election by 
‘the people’  are especially offended by the spending of campaign money in House and Senate races 
raised out-of-state” and that employing such a process “potentially expands the political power of 
wealthier states, like New York and California, while reducing the power of poorer states”). 
70. Raskin and Bonifaz describe the problem that the poor face under the current system: 
[W]e contend that the current regime—the combination of the “wealth primary” and 
incumbent self-subsidies—sets up an economic gauntlet that, in “every practical 
sense,” prevents less affluent candidates—”potential office seekers lacking both 
personal wealth and affluent backers”—from competing for office.  This system 
sharply reduces voter choice and “falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as 
candidates, according to their economic status . . . .”  This effect denies huge numbers 
of people meaningful electoral choice and unlawfully degrades their influence on the 
political process as a whole. 
Id. at 279–80 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972)). 
71. See Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1202 (observing that 
after reform “the current wealth and class-based exclusion of political candidates—along with its 
corresponding structural bias in government—would be eliminated”). 
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III. Campaign Finance Through the Framework of Race 
While the Reformers claim that the Court in Buckley overlooked 
important political realities, the Reformers’ class-based analysis is in-
complete as well because it ignores critical factors related to race.72  
Reformers focus on issues of equality and access and compare exclusion in 
the campaign finance context to racial exclusion in the voting rights context 
to make their case.73  Nevertheless, Reformers have not examined policies 
that have illegitimately shaped the distribution of property, such as past state-
sanctioned discrimination against racial minorities and the impact of these 
historical policies on the current racial distribution of wealth and the ability 
of racial minorities to participate in a privately financed political system.74 
 
72. Although a few Reformers have briefly acknowledged isolated examples of how campaign 
finance may affect people of color, the scholars have not engaged in a comprehensive analysis of 
the significance of race in the campaign finance context.  For example, Jamin Raskin and John 
Bonifaz acknowledge that financial disadvantages faced by minority candidates may implicate 
concerns under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but they relegate their examination to a footnote.  See 
Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 279 n.26.  The scholars admit that their 
research is “[p]reliminary” and that “[t]he question of a Voting Rights Act violation . . . is beyond 
the scope of this Article.”  Id.  Cass Sunstein briefly mentions that “[s]ometimes minority 
candidates can succeed only with the help of PACs specifically organized for their particular 
benefit.  For this reason, PAC limits will in some circumstances diminish the power of minority 
candidates.”  Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1409–10.  Sunstein uses this example to explain why 
campaign finance restrictions are sometimes problematic, but he does not engage in a specific 
analysis of the costs and benefits to people of color of PAC contribution limits, nor does he offer a 
more comprehensive analysis of how the current campaign finance system as a whole may benefit 
or disadvantage people of color.  Richard Hasen briefly acknowledged race-based identities in his 
piece calling for a public system that allows citizens, rather than government, to allocate public 
resources to candidates.  See Hasen, supra note 39, at 56–58.  Terry Smith, who has written 
primarily on minority political participation in the voting rights context, served as the principal 
author on a “race and campaign finance” panel that was a part of a voting rights symposium 
sponsored by the North Carolina Law Review.  Smith examined theoretical issues, such as the 
different meanings that certain election-reform groups attach to the term “political equality.”  Smith 
also sketched out policy issues related to legislative proposals to reform campaign finance.  Other 
participants on the panel responded to Smith’s article.  See Smith, supra note 6; Issacharoff, supra 
note 6; Daniel H. Lowenstein, supra note 6; Spencer Overton, Voices From the Past: Race, 
Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1541 (2001).  In addressing legislative reforms, 
subpart V(B) of this Article examines these commentators’ opinions. 
73. See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 308–09 (comparing the 
“white primary” that excluded African Americans from the selection of candidates (invalidated by 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)) to the “wealth primary” of the current campaign finance 
system, which excludes the poor from determining who will be able to run for office). 
74. Several civil-rights and campaign finance activists have addressed race and campaign 
finance at conferences sponsored by Howard Law School and the National Voting Rights Institute, 
the Brennan Center, and the Asian Law Journal at the University of California, Berkeley.  The 
presentations contained critiques by activists, policymakers, and legal practitioners.  They did not, 
however, constitute comprehensive treatment of race and campaign finance by academic legal 
commentators.  See, e.g., John Bonifaz et al., Comment, Challenging the Campaign Finance System 
as a Voting Rights Barrier: A Legal Strategy, 43 HOW. L.J. 63 (1999); Roger Wilkins et al., 
Comment, Campaign Finance as a Civil Rights Issue, 43 HOW. L.J. 41 (1999); Edward M. Chen, 
Introduction to Edward M. Chen & Dale Minami, Nat’l Asian Pac. Am. Legal Consortium et al., 
Petition for Hearing Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 5 ASIAN L.J. 353 (1998); Edward 
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Note that the analysis advanced in this Part focuses primarily on the 
racial identity of citizens and contributors, rather than on the racial identity of 
the candidates who receive money.  The ability of candidates of color to 
attract sufficient funds is important as a policy matter but is not, in and of 
itself, the end game.75  Concentrating solely on the success of candidates of 
color ignores the reality that candidates are accountable, in part, to 
contributors.  Contributors determine which candidates of color can run 
viable campaigns, but these contributors do not always accurately reflect the 
interests of minority citizens.  For example, one might overstate racial 
progress by focusing exclusively on the electoral success of a candidate of 
color whose campaign has been financed almost exclusively by white 
contributors.  Further, focusing solely on the electoral success of candidates 
of color dismisses the essential role of citizen participation, choice, and in-
fluence inherent in campaign finance—all forms of democratic participation 
that would have independent constitutional value even if candidates of color 
and contributors always faithfully represented the interests of citizens of 
color. 
To understand the structural problems inherent in the existing campaign 
finance system, one must consider how racial discrimination has influenced 
the distribution of property.  Noble factors such as hard work, discipline, and 
intelligence only partially shape the current property distribution.  This Part 
analyzes historical and contemporary racial realities, which the Reformers 
have often overlooked, to create a framework that allows for a broader, more 
comprehensive critique of current campaign finance jurisprudence. 
 
M. Chen & Dale Minami, Nat’l Asian Pac. Am. Legal Consortium et al., Petition for Hearing 
Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 5 ASIAN L.J. 357 (1998); L. Ling-chi Wang, Beyond 
Identity and Racial Politics: Asian Americans and the Campaign Fund-Raising Controversy, 5 
ASIAN L.J. 329 (1998).  A number of individuals and civil-rights groups represented at the Howard 
conference convened and established The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, which recognizes campaign 
finance as a civil-rights issue and explores the racial impact of the current campaign finance system.  
See The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, at http://www.flhp.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); see also Ben 
White, Shadow Moves to New Venue with Old Issue, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2000, at A15, 2000 WL 
25410546 (describing efforts of The Fannie Lou Hamer Project “to encourage Americans to think of 
campaign finance reform as a civil rights issue”). 
 While this Article criticizes the academic writings of Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz for 
focusing solely on class to the exclusion of race, it is worth noting that Bonifaz was a principal 
figure in organizing the Howard conference and The Fannie Lou Hamer Project.  Also, in addition 
to the Berkeley conference, others have discussed the campaign finance investigations of Asian 
Americans following the 1996 Presidential Elections.  See, e.g., Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: 
The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 503 (1997); Jessica S. Horrocks, Note, Campaigns, Contributions and Citizenship: The First 
Amendment Right of Resident Aliens to Finance Federal Elections, 38 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1997). 
75. The protection of voters of color, rather than candidates of color, is the primary concern of 
the Voting Rights Act.  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986) (“[T]he fact that race of 
voter and race of candidate is often correlated is not directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry.  Under § 2, it 
is the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race 
of the candidate, that is important.”) 
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A. Past Discriminatory Policies Shape Property Distribution76 
Governmental entities have long used racial identity to define and 
allocate property rights.  Official government action in the form of 
proclamations, statutes, and court decisions took land from Native Americans 
based on their racial and cultural identity and reallocated this property to 
white private actors.77  The law contemplated and enforced the appropriation 
of labor from African Americans through slavery,78 which primarily 
benefited white private actors.79  The law also promoted immigration from 
European countries, essentially determining the racial makeup of those who 
would count as full citizens in the United States.80  As white Americans 
 
76. While this section concentrates primarily on African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, 
and Native Americans in the United States, the analysis is not limited to these groups.  Distributions 
of property have been illegitimate for other reasons, including but not limited to gender 
discrimination.  See generally, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN, WOMEN & HOUSING: A 
REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN FIVE AMERICAN CITIES, at iv (1975) (reporting problems “that 
women in American cities face when they try to acquire and maintain a decent place to live”).  The 
analysis is also applicable to groups in other democracies whose lack of control over resources 
stems in large part from historical decisions based on race or ethnicity, such as many indigenous 
and formerly segregated or enslaved peoples throughout North and South America, South Africa, 
Zimbabwe, Australia, and other places.  Note that while this Article makes a value-based judgment 
that racially discriminatory rules are illegitimate, the Article recognizes the absence of a universally 
accepted baseline from which to identify legitimate laws or allocations of property. 
77. See Joseph W. Singer, The Continuing Conquest: American Indian Nations, Property Law, 
and Gunsmoke, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 97, 102 (1991) (“[P]roperty and sovereignty in the United 
States have a racial basis.  The land was taken by force by white people from peoples of color 
thought by the conquerors to be racially inferior.”); WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: 
AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 1, 
6 (1977) (noting royal control of land grants and the tradition of individual freehold ownership, both 
of which contributed to the appropriation of land occupied by primitive aboriginal tribes). 
78. Cf. John Locke, Of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 15, 18 
(C.B. MacPherson ed., 1992) (“[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. . . .  The Labour of 
his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.”). 
79. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1718 (1993) (“The 
social relations that produced racial identity as a justification for slavery also had implications for 
the conceptualization of property.  This result was predictable, as the institution of slavery, lying at 
the very core of economic relations, was bound up with the idea of property.  Through slavery, race 
and economic domination were fused.”).  But cf. Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision Of The 
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 466 (1989) (“Slavery was evil because it destroyed 
much of the richest land in the South; it degraded labor and the meaning of labor for poor white 
working men in the South. . . .  Thus, slavery pulled white workers down in two ways: one, by 
direct competition with slave labor in the South, and two, by associating all the industrious efforts 
of workers with those of the degraded slaves.”). 
80. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 152 (4th ed. 1998) (“Some federal [immigration] laws have been blatantly racist, 
prohibiting immigration and naturalization of aliens from China and Japan and favoring northern 
and western Europeans over southern and eastern Europeans.”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
853, 859 (1987) (“The Chinese Exclusion doctrine and its extensions have permitted, and perhaps 
encouraged, paranoia, xenophobia, and racism, particularly during periods of international 
tension.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Law, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic 
Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) (analyzing the relationship between 
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moved west in the 1800s, the law tolerated discriminatory practices in the 
Southwest that stripped Mexican Americans of nearly all opportunities to 
own property.81  In addition to conquest, slavery, and immigration policy, 
well-known public and private racial barriers in education, employment, and 
business disadvantaged people of color while benefiting others by artificially 
reducing competition.82 
Less apparent factors also help perpetuate economic disparities between 
whites and people of color.  The benefits derived from facially dis-
criminatory government policies may be multiplied by facially neutral 
government policy and economic markets, and may thus have a greater 
impact today than they did when originally enacted.  For example, the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), formed in 1934, promoted a model 
racially restrictive covenant that whites could use to maintain neighborhood 
“stability,” thereby explicitly promoting segregated home ownership among 
whites, and discouraging home ownership among nonwhites.83  Federally 
subsidized mortgages often required that owners incorporate into their deeds 
racially restrictive covenants,84 and builders adopted the covenants so that 
 
the history of racial discrimination in immigration law and the civil rights of racial minorities in the 
United States). 
81. See generally FRANK D. BEAN & MARTA TIENDA, THE HISPANIC POPULATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 17–22 (1987) (discussing the oppression of Mexican American landowners by 
Anglo settlers after the Mexican-American War); CHARLES F. MARDEN ET AL., MINORITIES IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY 135, 142, 152, 259–91 (1992) (discussing Mexican American immigration and 
dominance by Anglo settlers); MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 285–90 (2000) 
(noting that Mexicans’ property was taken “through official and unofficial force and fraud”). 
82. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH / WHITE WEALTH: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 51 (1995) (stating that “every circumstance of bias and 
discrimination against blacks has produced a . . . positive gain for whites”); GILBERT THOMAS 
STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW (1910) (arguing that race distinctions in 
laws have hampered the economic and educational opportunities of African Americans). 
83. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 207–18 (1985) (recounting the 
development of Federal Housing Administration appraisal standards that discriminated against 
African American communities by favoring lending in homogenous subdivisions); DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS 53–55 (1993) (documenting the effect of discrimination resulting from Federal 
Housing Administration appraisal procedures in neighborhoods comprised of “inharmonious racial 
or nationality groups”); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 39–41 (analyzing the continued 
effects of the earlier FHA policies).  In addition to housing policies that promoted home ownership 
along racial lines, a number of other government policies have promoted racial disparities in 
property distribution.  For example, “[i]n the first half of the twentieth century, various western 
states passed ‘alien land laws’ that limited the right to own property to aliens racially eligible to 
naturalize, thereby effectively prohibiting foreign-born Asian residents from acquiring certain types 
of land.”  SINGER, supra note 10, at 42; see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1947) 
(invalidating specific application of California’s Alien Land Law as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
84. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1848 (1994) (citing CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A 
STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 234–35 (1955)). 
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their property qualified for federal insurance.85  After perpetuating this 
segregation, the federal government, concerned more about race than any 
other demographic trend, “consistently gave black neighborhoods the lowest 
rating for purposes of distributing federally subsidized mortgages.”86  Private 
lenders often followed the federal system in making loan decisions.87 
The racial disparity in wealth realized through home ownership and 
home value originally caused by federal housing policies has since been 
compounded by seemingly neutral public and private decisions.  Because 
people of color are less likely to own homes, they are less likely to take 
advantage of tax provisions allowing for the deduction of a large percentage 
of their housing costs (all property taxes and mortgage interest).88  Further, 
the home values appreciated dramatically during the period between 1934 
and the 1970s, and this increase benefited whites more than people of color.89  
Even people of color who were able to purchase homes were less likely than 
whites to benefit from increasing home values because of the slower rate of 
appreciation of property in nonwhite areas.90 
B. People of Color Control Fewer Resources 
Intergenerational transfers of wealth have carried forward past racial 
disparities in wealth that arose directly from state-sponsored discrimination.91  
While assets conveyed at death are important and constitute perhaps the most 
 
85. See Ford, supra note 84, at 1848 (citing Martha Mahoney, Note, Law and Racial 
Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1258 
(1990)). 
86. See Ford, supra note 84, at 1848 & n.9 (1994) (citing JACKSON, supra note 83, at 198–99; 
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 83, at 52). 
87. See Ford, supra note 84, at 1848 & n.9 (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 83, at 52). 
88. See I.R.C. §§ 164(a), 163(h)(2)(D)–(3) (2000); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 44 
(“[T]he U.S. tax code channels benefits and encourages property and capital asset accumulation 
differentially by race.”). 
89. See Richard Banks, Nondiscriminatory Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76 B.U. L. 
REV. 669, 684–85 (1996) (reviewing OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82). 
90. See RAYMOND S. FRANKLIN, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS 124–25 (1991) (noting that 
homes owned by middle-class African Americans “do not appreciate as rapidly in value over time 
as homes owned by whites”); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 40, 150 (observing that 
“similar housing investments made by whites and blacks yield vastly divergent returns—to the 
distinct disadvantage of blacks”); Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: 
Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area, 100 AM. J. SOC. 750 (1994) (arguing that racial stereotypes 
play an important role in explaining whites’ resistance to living in integrated neighborhoods); Ford, 
supra note 84, at 1849–52, 1861 (arguing that race-neutral legal doctrine reinforces residential 
segregation created by public policy and private actors, causing significant disparity in the 
appreciation of homes owned by African Americans compared with homes owned by whites, in 
education, and in political influence). 
91. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH AND SOCIAL 
POLICY IN AMERICA 42–53 (1999) (arguing that many racial inequities result from the disparities in 
accumulated family wealth). 
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obvious way that people pass on wealth,92 wealth also flows from other types 
of intergenerational transfers.  For example, wealth commonly derives from 
the “education, experiences, friendships, and contacts” a child obtains from 
parents.93  Whites also disproportionately tend to receive financial assistance 
from parents to handle the challenges of early adulthood.  For example, 
whites are twice as likely as African Americans to receive family assistance 
in purchasing a home.94  Despite being motivated by a concern for offspring 
rather than racial animus, intergenerational transfers of wealth perpetuate the 
effects of racially discriminatory policies from over a century ago, such as 
slavery and conquest.  These intergenerational transfers also perpetuate 
discriminatory policies enforced only a few decades ago, such as racially 
disparate immigration policy and segregation in education, employment, and 
housing. 
The effects of past discriminatory policies are partially reflected in 
contemporary disparities in income among racial groups.95  Income is rele-
vant in the campaign finance context because those with higher incomes are 
likely to make more and larger political expenditures and contributions.96  In 
 
92. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 155 (“Assets bequeathed at death are . . . [the] 
most direct form of inheritance.”). 
93. See id. at 152; Ngina S. Chiteji & Frank P. Stafford, Portfolio Choices of Parents and their 
Children as Young Adults: Asset Accumulation by African-American Families, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 
377, 377–80 (1999) (studying cross-generational influences on wealth and finding that a young 
family’s likelihood of owning stock, a home, and other assets is influenced by whether parents held 
these financial assets). 
94. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 145 (citing an observation by the Los Angeles 
Survey of Urban Inequality that whites are twice as likely as African Americans “to receive family 
assistance in purchasing a home”). 
95. Income consists of the amount of money an individual or household earns during a given 
period, and includes earnings, unemployment compensation, workers’ compensation, social 
security, supplemental security income, public assistance, payments to veterans, survivor benefits, 
and disability benefits.  U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS)—
DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/ 
cps/cpsdef.html. 
96. Of contributors to 1996 congressional elections who responded to an academic survey 
funded by the Joyce Foundation and directed by scholars at a number of universities, 81% had 
annual incomes over $100,000, and 20% had annual incomes higher than $500,000.  See Green et 
al., supra note 2, at 13.  While African Americans, Asian Americans, Latinos, and Native 
Americans comprise approximately 30% of the population of the United States, they constitute only 
9% of the Americans who make more than $100,000.  See CENSUS POPULATION ESTIMATES, supra 
note 1, at 1 (indicating that as of November 1, 2000, African Americans made up 12.8%, Hispanics 
11.9%, Asian Americans 4.1%, and American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts 0.9% of the population 
of the United States); Andrew Hacker, The Rich: Who They Are; The Upper Tail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
19, 1995, at 70, LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File (“In 1993, about 2.7 million men and women 
made more than $100,000.  Of those 2.7 million . . . 91 percent are white.  People who identify 
themselves as Asian, Hispanic [or] African-American each make up about 3 percent.”).  Even minor 
differences in income affect the amount that an individual is likely to contribute to political 
campaigns.  See Henry E. Brady et al., Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 
89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 285 (1995) (finding that an otherwise average person’s political 
contributions will increase by more than 50% when the person’s income is increased by $10,000). 
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1995, median household income was $35,766 for whites, $22,860 for 
Latinos, and $22,393 for African Americans.97  While Asian Americans as a 
whole have higher median household incomes than whites do, a number of 
Asian American ethnic groups face economic challenges similar to those 
faced by African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans.  For example, 
in 1989, the most recent year in which census data on the income of specific 
Asian American ethnic groups is available, the median household income for 
whites was $32,476, compared to $18,837 for Cambodian Americans, 
$14,276 for Hmong Americans, and $23,019 for Laotian Americans.98  As 
discussed below, even though past discrimination has not impacted the 
economic status of every individual of color to the same degree, the current 
system of funding campaigns poses problems because past discrimination 
continues to impact the economic status of many people of color. 
An examination of contemporary household wealth reveals a more 
complete picture of the ability and likelihood to contribute or spend political 
money.99  While income reflects one’s earnings in a particular year, wealth 
represents, in part, the accumulation of income over long periods of time.100  
A person who earns no income but has inherited a great deal of wealth is 
likely to control significant resources that she may use to participate in the 
current campaign finance process.  Further, the opportunities available due to 
wealth significantly shape one’s future income and the income of one’s 
offspring.  Wealth reflects a type of “resource available for improving life 
chances, providing further opportunities, securing prestige, passing status 
along to one’s family, and influencing the political process.”101  As shown 
 
97. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at viii 
(1996). 
98. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, ASIANS AND PACIFIC 
ISLANDERS IN THE UNITED STATES, TABLE 5, INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF SELECTED ASIAN 
AND PACIFIC ISLANDER GROUPS BY NATIVITY, CITIZENSHIP, AND YEAR OF ENTRY: 1990, at 145–
61 (1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cp3/cp-3-5.pdf. 
99. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 58 (“[N]et worth . . . conveys the straightforward 
value of all assets less any debts.”).  While studies have not engaged in detailed analyses of whether 
income or wealth has the greater impact on the likelihood that an individual will make political 
contributions, some commentators suggest that, in certain situations, wealth has a greater impact on 
charitable contributions.  See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 
Part I—Aggregate and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT’L TAX J. 81, 90 (1975) (“At . . . very high 
income levels, adjusted gross income is a less adequate measure of economic income and wealth is 
a more important influence on giving.”). 
100. See id. at 2 (“Wealth is what people own, while income is what people receive for work, 
retirement, or social welfare.  Wealth signifies the command over financial resources that a family 
has accumulated over its lifetime along with those resources that have been inherited across 
generations.”). 
101. Id. at 32. 
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below, racial disparities in wealth are much broader than racial disparities in 
income.102 
In 1995, the median net worth for white households ($61,000) was over 
eight times greater than for African American households ($7400) and over 
twelve times greater than for Latino households ($5000).103  Although data 
regarding the net worth of Asian Americans is not available, it is likely that it 
is lower than white Americans’ net worth, as Asian Americans have a lower 
rate of home ownership and business ownership.104  Net worth “conveys the 
straightforward value of all assets less any debts,” and represents financial 
stability.105  In the campaign finance context net worth is germane because a 
family with a high net worth presumably has fewer obligations and more 
 
102. Some have asserted that net worth overlooks the value of future income, and thus income 
is an important component in measuring wealth.  See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century 
Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 746 (1988) (“Because this way 
of measuring wealth excludes the capitalized value of the income streams generated by human 
capital, and because it excludes the capitalized value of private-pension and Social Security income 
streams, it materially overstates the disparity between the top wealth holders and the rest of the 
populace.”); George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McClure, Jr., Direct Consumption Taxes, 46 TAX L. 
REV. 407, 483 (1991) (asserting that an “accurate measurement of wealth in practice requires 
accurate measurements of income”).  Although “wealth and income are correlated within racial 
groups, . . . in cross-race comparisons the wealth-income correlation breaks down almost entirely.”  
Banks, supra note 89, at 675 n.26.  Racial disparities in wealth are significant even among those 
who make similar incomes and have attained similar educational status.  See MELVIN L. OLIVER & 
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, Race and Wealth, REV. BLACK POL. ECON., Spring 1989, at 17–18 (noting 
that, while the typical two-earner, black, married couple earns 77% as much as a white couple, 
“young white couples have nearly five times as much median [net worth] as young black couples”); 
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 94 tbl. 5.1 (observing that college-educated African 
Americans earn $29,440 per year, have a net worth of $17,437, and net financial assets of only 
$175, whereas college-educated whites earn on average $38,700 per year, have a net worth of 
$74,922, and net financial assets of $19,823); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to 
Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 443 (1998) (“Poverty-level 
whites control nearly as many mean net financial assets as the highest-earning Blacks.”); see 
generally MARIO BARRERA, RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST (1979); see also CHUCK 
COLLINS ET AL., SHIFTING FORTUNES: THE PERILS OF THE GROWING AMERICAN WEALTH GAP 55–
60 (1999) (attributing racial disparities in wealth to a variety of factors, including housing 
discrimination, inheritance, and parental contributions to home ownership and education); CHUCK 
COLLINS & FELICE YESKEL, UNITED FOR A FAIR ECONOMY, ECONOMIC APARTHEID IN AMERICA: 
A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY & INSECURITY 52–54 (2000) (noting that, since wealth 
accumulates over generations, the areas of wealth and asset accumulation demonstrate the most 
profound impact of racial discrimination); CONLEY, supra note 91, 142–53 (arguing that many 
racial inequities result from the disparities in accumulated family wealth); NATIONAL URBAN 
LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1999 (William Spriggs et al. eds., 1999) (compiling 
statistics, charts, and essays on employment and wage gaps, health disparities, and educational 
levels). 
103. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 102, at 55, 57 fig. 10; see also CONLEY, supra note 91, at tbl. 
A2.1 (finding that in 1994, the median family net worth for whites was $72,000 and for African 
Americans was $9771). 
104. See Kelvin M. Pollard & William P. O’Hare, America’s Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 54 
POPULATION BULL. NO. 3, Sept. 1999, at 37–39, available at http://www.prb.org/pubs/ 
population_bulletin/bu54-3/Income_Wealth_Poverty.htm. 
105. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 58. 
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disposable resources to spend on politics.106  Some studies suggest that racial 
disparities in net worth are growing.107 
Even more glaring racial disparities come to light when one examines 
financial wealth, which is net worth minus equity in owner-occupied 
housing.108  Because it is unlikely that an individual will sell or mortgage the 
home in which she lives in order to make a political contribution, financial 
wealth may be even more relevant than net worth in the campaign finance 
context.109  In 1995, financial wealth was $18,000 for the typical white 
 
106. Net worth and net financial assets are two possible ways to measure wealth.  Net worth is 
distinguishable from net financial assets, which are “those financial assets normally available for 
present or future conversion into ready cash.”  See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 60.  
Unlike net worth, a measurement of net financial assets does not take into account debt.  Net worth 
is a better measurement of a family’s ability to make political contributions and expenditures, and 
likelihood of making them, because a family with high net financial assets might have a number of 
other financial obligations, and thus have less disposable income to spend on politics.  Note, 
however, that net financial assets represent a household’s command over resources that it can use, if 
necessary, to improve its position.  See id.  Therefore, a measurement of net financial assets might 
reflect the amount a household could spend on politics in response to a crucial issue that they 
needed to address.  For the purposes of this Article, however, net worth is a more appropriate 
measure of wealth. 
107. See Blacks’ Net Worth Slips, SUN REPORTER, Feb. 24, 2000, at 1 (“Blacks are tumbling 
backwards.  The net worth of the median Black household in the U.S. fell by 17 percent to $7,000 
between the years 1994 to 1999, according to a national survey conducted by the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics. . . .  During the same period the net worth of the median U.S. household rose by 
9 percent to $59,000 as the median net worth for white households reached $84,400 . . . .  [F]or 
every dollar of wealth the median white household held in 1999, the median Black household held 
nine cents.”). 
 Others have predicted that the purchasing power of minority communities will increase in the 
near future.  (Note, however, that increased spending is not necessarily related to increased wealth, 
and may lead to decreased wealth).  See Robert Dominguez, Financial Futures; Hispanics and Wall 
Street, HISPANIC, Jan. 1, 1999, at 38 (“Latinos . . . will be the nation’s largest minority by the year 
2010. . . .  [T]he community’s buying power is presently worth more than $350 billion a year and 
growing at a faster rate than that of Americans as a whole.”); see also id. (“[T]he growth in 
Hispanic spending is predicted to almost double within the next five years (a 93 percent jump, 
compared to a projected 13 percent increase for the general population, according to Trends 
Research Institute in Rhinebeck, New York).”). 
108. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 102, at 55, 57 fig. 10 (discussing financial wealth (net 
worth minus equity in owner-occupied housing)); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 58 (“[W]e 
decided to measure wealth by way of two concepts.  The first, net worth (NW) conveys the 
straightforward value of all assets less any debts.  The second, net financial assets (NFA), excludes 
equity accrued in a home or vehicle from the calculation of a households [sic] available 
resources.”). 
109. Even though financial wealth (net worth minus equity in owner-occupied housing) is very 
important in the analysis of racial disparities in the campaign finance context, home ownership is 
important not only because it explains net worth but also because it helps explain the financial 
wealth and income of future generations that control political money.  In other words, even though 
one may not live in her parents’ home, the fact that the parents owned a home may positively affect 
that person.  Intergenerational transfers of wealth that home ownership allows (e.g., taking out a 
mortgage to help one with college, bequeathing assets derived from the liquidation of the home) 
increase one’s financial wealth and income, and make one better positioned to make political 
contributions and expenditures. 
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household, $200 for the typical African American household, and $0 for the 
typical Latino household.110 
People of color are also less likely to control business interests, which 
accounted for $208 million (eighty-one percent) of the “soft money” 
contributions made in 1999 and the first half of 2000.111  As of the mid-
1990s, minorities represented only three percent of senior managers of 
Fortune 1000 companies,112 and only four percent of directors serving on cor-
porate boards.113  Indeed, prior to 1999, no African American had ever served 
as a chief executive officer of a Fortune 500 Company.114 
Similarly, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native 
Americans are disproportionately represented among those Americans 
having the direst financial conditions.  Whereas only 7.7% of whites live in 
poverty, 23.6% of African Americans, 22.8% of Latinos, and 25.9% of 
Native Americans live in poverty.115  Even though the median income for 
Asian Americans as a group is twelve percent higher than whites, the poverty 
 
110. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 102, at 55, 57 fig. 10; CONLEY, supra note 91, at tbl. A2.1. 
111. See Susan Schmidt, ‘Soft Money’ Contributions to Parties Hit $256 Million, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 8, 2000, at A7, 2000 WL 25414744 (“Although labor unions dramatically increased their soft 
money giving, to $16 million, more than triple their 1996 donations—they were dramatically 
outspent by business interests, which contributed $208 million, more than 12 times the amount 
given by labor.”).  The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 bans soft money gifts after 
November 6, 2002.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 
Stat. 81 (2002). 
112. See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF 
THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL, at iii (1995) (finding that “97% of the senior managers of Fortune 
1000 industrial and Fortune 500 companies are white”). 
113. See Shelley Donald Coolidge, For Most Minorities, Heads Still Bump the Glass Ceiling, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1996, at 3, 1996 WL 5045620 (“A nationwide survey released 
during the summer buttresses the government report.  Coopers & Lybrand found a slight increase in 
the numbers of minorities serving on corporate boards of directors, from 2 percent in 1994 to 4 
percent now.  Hispanics and Asians are at 1 percent each.”); Tamar Jacoby, In Asian America, 
COMMENTARY, July 1, 2000, at 21 (observing that “of the 7,000 seats on the boards of the Fortune 
500 companies, fewer than 50—less than 1 percent—are held by Asian-Americans”). 
114. See Edward Robinson & Jonathan Hickman, The Diversity Elite, FORTUNE, July 19, 1999, 
at 62 (“In January, Chairman and CEO Franklin Raines became the first black to head a Fortune 500 
company.”); Heather Harris, The Perceived Influence of Culture and Ethnicity on the 
Communicative Dynamics of the United Nations Secretariat, BUS. COMM. Q., June 1, 2001, at 105, 
106 (“Before Raines, no member of a co-cultural group, outside of European Americans, had ever 
been CEO of a Fortune 500 corporation.”); Christine Y. Chen & Jonathan Hickman, America’s 50 
Best Companies for Minorities, FORTUNE, July 10, 2000, at 190 (observing that Avon CEO “Andrea 
Jung . . . is the first and only minority female to hold that title in the FORTUNE 500”). 
115. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1999, at v (2000), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-210.pdf; Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of 
Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REV. 711, 714 (1996) 
(“‘American Indian reservations are notable for their extreme and persistent poverty—reservation 
Indians are the poorest minority in the United States. . . .  [I]n some tribes, such as the Navajo, more 
than 45 percent of families live in poverty.”) (citing Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the 
Glue? Institutional Bases of American Indian Economic Development, MALCOLM WIENER CTR. 
FOR SOCIAL POLICY PRS 91-1 (Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Report No. 52, 1991)). 
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rate of Asian Americans is fifty percent greater than whites.116  In 1995, only 
fifteen percent of white households had a zero or negative net worth (greater 
debt than assets), compared with thirty-one percent of African American and 
thirty-eight percent of Latino households.117 
The aforementioned data should not suggest that racial inequality can be 
measured with straightforward, mathematical precision.  A number of com-
plicating factors exist.  For example, some citizens of color migrated to the 
United States after discriminatory laws were repealed.  Government policies 
have attempted to recruit well-educated and highly skilled foreign-born 
workers, including people of color.118  The adverse impact of discriminatory 
laws is more attenuated for some individuals of color than for others.  Some 
people of color are wealthy, and some white individuals live in poverty.  
These complicating factors, however, do not detract from the proposition that 
under the current campaign finance system, many people of color are dis-
advantaged due to past discriminatory laws that have shaped the existing 
distribution of resources.119  A precise measurement of past racial dis-
crimination might be appropriate when analyzing issues such as government 
allocation of reparation payments, but such precision is not necessary when 
deciding whether courts should rely on the distribution of private property as 
an adequate baseline for political participation. 
C. People of Color Make Fewer Financial Contributions 
It should come as no surprise that demographic profiles of political 
contributors reflect racial disparities in the control over economic 
resources.120  A 1997 study directed by scholars at Georgetown University, 
 
116. See Pollard & O’Hare, supra note 104, at 34, 41. 
117. COLLINS ET AL., supra note 102, at 81 tbl. A-6; CONLEY, supra note 91, at tbl. A2.1. 
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (allowing visas for priority workers who possess 
“extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics”); id. § 1153 (b)(1)(C) 
(allowing visas for “certain multinational executives and managers”); id. § 1153(b)(2) (allowing 
visas for “members of the professions holding advanced degrees or aliens of exceptional ability”); 
see also Jung S. Hahm, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: 
Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1673, 1678–79 (2000) (observing that provision of the Immigration Act of 1990 “was the result of 
congressional efforts to increase admissions of foreign skilled workers into the United States”); Bill 
Ong Hing, Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOW. L.J. 237, 267 (1994) (observing 
that “the near tripling of occupational visas from 54,000 to 140,000 in the 1990 legislation signals 
the beginning of a shift in the focus of U.S. immigration law from concern with family reunification 
toward a policy of importing skilled workers”). 
119. In other words, even though past discrimination has not impacted the economic status of 
every individual of color to the same degree, the current system of funding campaigns poses 
problems because many people of color continue to be adversely impacted by past discrimination. 
120. Empirical research generally focuses on broad questions of the racial identity of 
contributors.  Studies have not engaged in a detailed analysis that compares the contributions of 
people of color and whites with identical economic profiles.  While this issue deserves inquiry, it 
does not detract from the critique that the current distribution of private property has been shaped by 
illegitimate factors such as past state-sponsored racial discrimination and is thus an inappropriate 
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the University of Akron, the University of Maryland, and the University of 
Rochester surveyed individuals who had contributed $200 or more to 
congressional campaigns in the 1996 election cycle.121  Of those who 
responded to the survey, ninety-five percent identified themselves as white, 
and less than one percent identified themselves as people of color.122  These 
figures do not appear to be unusual.  For example, a 1992 study of 
contributors to winning candidates for the Georgia legislature revealed that 
ninety-seven percent of contributors were white while only two percent were 
African American.123 
Another study found that a disproportionately small number of 
contributions come from neighborhoods that are populated predominantly by 
people of color.  The study, sponsored by Public Campaign,124 compared the 
racial composition of zip codes with zip-code data disclosed by political 
contributors.125  The study noted that in zip codes populated predominantly 
by people of color, the average per capita income was $9046.126  For every 
10,000 residents in these zip codes, only eight political contributions were 
 
baseline for the existing campaign finance system.  In other words, even if Latinos with a household 
income over $100,000 gave as much as whites with a household income over $100,000, there would 
still be questions about the propriety of conditioning a crucial form of political participation on 
distributions of property shaped by past discrimination, as Latino households are three times less 
likely than white households to have a household income of $100,000.  While more empirical 
research would likely provide important insights, one does not need a mathematically precise 
understanding of the relationship between race and campaign finance contributions to raise 
questions about the legitimacy of the current campaign finance system. 
121. Smaller contributions need not be reported to the Federal Election Commission.  See 
Green et al., supra note 2, at 2.  The study was based on data obtained through a 1997 mail survey 
of contributors randomly chosen from Federal Election Commission records.  About half of those 
selected responded to the survey, and the conclusions of the study were based upon these 1118 
usable responses; the margin or error is plus or minus 4%.  See id. at 12. 
122. See id. at 2 (showing that less than 1% of contributors surveyed identified themselves as 
people of color, whereas 95% indicated they are white); Ellen Miller, Guess What? Political Donors 
Are Old, Rich, White Men, THE HILL, July 1, 1998, at 5, LEXIS, Nexis Library, HILLNW File 
(observing that “less than 1 percent in the Joyce survey identified themselves as people of color”). 
123. See JOHN A. CLARK & JOHN M. BRUCE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN GEORGIA 7 
(1994) (“In the 1990 Census, the population of Georgia was reported to be 71% white and 27% 
black.  Our pool of respondents was just over 97% white, with only about 2% black.”); Richard 
Whitt, ‘Typical’ Donor No Average Georgian, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 14, 1994, at C2, 1994 
WL 8920970 (“More than 97 percent of contributors responding to the survey were white and only 
2 percent were black. . . .  Questionnaires were mailed in August and September to 1155 
contributors, with 357 initial responses.”). 
124. Public Campaign is a public-interest organization that favors public financing of 
campaigns.  See PUBLIC CAMPAIGN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
RACE 2 (1998).  For general information on Public Campaign and an abbreviated version of the 
study, see http://www.publicampaign.org. 
125. See id. at 11–13.  The Federal Election Commission does not require that contributors 
disclose their racial identity.  See id. at 11.  Therefore, to obtain its findings, the Public Campaign 
study compared Census Bureau data on racial composition of zip codes with Federal Election 
Commission data on contributions given by individuals in particular zip codes to federal candidates, 
political action committees, and political parties during the 1995–1996 election cycle.  See id. 
126. See id. at 37. 
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made.127  In contrast, in the average zip code, incomes were thirty-seven 
percent higher and individuals were three times more likely to make political 
contributions.128  In the twenty-six zip codes in which residents gave the most 
money, incomes were 408% higher and individuals were fifty-four times 
more likely to contribute than were those in predominantly nonwhite areas.129  
Also, in comparing the twenty-six zip codes with the highest rates of giving 
to the 2,492 predominantly nonwhite zip codes, the study found that the 
680,000 inhabitants of the former contributed more money than did the 41.3 
million inhabitants of the latter.130 
Minority participation is much higher in other forms of political activity 
that are not so closely related to control over economic resources.131  For 
example, even though minorities gave only about one percent of political 
contributions, they cast eighteen percent of the votes in the 2000 general 
presidential election.132  Minorities’ failure to make political contributions is 
attributable more to a lack of resources than to a lack of desire to donate 
money.133 
The political reality that people of color control fewer resources and do 
not make significant financial contributions to political campaigns are 
relevant to two critiques of existing campaign finance jurisprudence.  First, 
speech markets created in the campaign finance context are not “neutral” or 
 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 36–37. 
129. See id. at 37.  Note that while Public Campaign reports that the average American zip code 
is 75.7% white, the twenty-six zip codes where residents gave the most money have an only slightly 
higher white population of 78%.  See id. at 22–23, 36 (calculation based on chart).  One might argue 
that these figures indicate that higher-end neighborhoods contain significant numbers of people of 
color who are making contributions.  Public Campaign suggests that, instead, this data often reflects 
that a single zip code contains both high-contributing wealthy white neighborhoods and low-
contributing working-class neighborhoods populated predominantly by people of color.  See id. at 6. 
130. See id. at 37.  While racial disparities in political spending have not been studied as 
extensively as racial disparities in political contributions, there is no evidence that the expenditure 
racial disparity is any less stark than the contribution racial disparity. 
131. See Henry E. Brady et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation, in CLASSIFYING BY 
RACE 354, 361–62 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1995) (“When it comes to time, minority activists are not 
less active than their white counterparts. . . .  The situation is different with respect to money.  
Among contributors, whites—who are, as we saw, slightly more likely than African Americans and 
considerably more likely than Latinos to make campaign donations—give substantially more than 
African Americans or Latinos do when they contribute.”); BRADY ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY 
233 (1995) (“When it comes to activity within a campaign, African Americans are more likely to 
say that they have worked in a campaign but less likely to say that they have given money.”). 
132. See Marjorie Connelly, Who Voted: A Portrait of American Politics, 1976–2000, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, § 4, at 4, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.  Even if reasons in 
addition to unequal access to wealth partially contribute to racial disparities in political giving, such 
as political apathy, the racial disparities in private wealth and the reasons behind those disparities 
still exist and invite questions about the legitimacy of the current campaign finance system. 
133. See Brady et al., supra note 96, at 283 (“[T]he major determinant of giving money is 
having money.  Years of education also matter, but neither free time nor civic skills affect monetary 
contributions.”). 
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“fair,” but are based on existing property allocations that have been shaped 
by illegitimate factors such as past discriminatory public policies.  Second, 
racial disparities in the existing campaign finance system exacerbate racial 
disparities in the future allocation of resources. 
IV. Insights Gained Through the Recognition of Race 
The Reformers overlook historical, social, and economic realities 
related to race and campaign finance.  Consequently, the Reformers suffer 
from some of the same shortcomings of the Formalists by failing to 
appreciate fully the interests of many of those disadvantaged by the current 
campaign finance system.  Although some might assume that the Reformers’ 
class-based analysis subsumes the concerns of people of color without 
raising the polarizing issue of race, the class analysis inadequately explores 
the causes and effects of the current system of financing democracy.134  
Acknowledging racial realities highlights two important critiques of the 
current system.  Race shows that the legal arguments used to defend a 
campaign finance system based on the existing distribution of wealth rely on 
democratic assumptions that are in no way neutral or apolitical, and that the 
existing system has the effect of perpetuating racial disparities in resources. 
A. The False Neutrality of Current Campaign Finance 
By overlooking racial realities, the Reformers fail to point out the biases 
inherent in narrow First Amendment applications that base political 
participation on private property.  Acknowledging race allows the Reformers 
to craft better responses to attacks by First Amendment Formalists that are 
framed as seemingly objective and detached observations.135 
Among their criticisms, the Formalists argue that Reformers overlook 
the content-neutrality requirement of the First Amendment136 and, by con-
 
134. Cf. Alan Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1880, 
1891–93 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 
1980)) (criticizing Marxist attempts to make race issues a subset of a larger class analysis). 
135. Commentators have recognized the Court’s failure to wrestle with important political 
realities in other contexts involving decisions about democracy.  See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, New 
Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and Richard Briffault’s Essays on Bush v. 
Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407 (2001) (discussing the Court’s failure, in cases reviewing the 
political process, to address difficult political realities related to race and poverty and questions as to 
the meaning of effective representation). 
136. Even Reformers have picked up on this theme of neutrality, and do not consider the past 
misallocation of property.  For example, Fiss argues: 
Neutrality is indeed a requirement of the First Amendment, in the sense that it would 
violate the Amendment for the state to limit the expenditures of candidate A in order to 
further the candidacy of B because the state prefers candidate B’s views.  Democratic 
theory and the First Amendment leave the choice of candidates and their agendas 
entirely to the electorate.  A more difficult problem arises when a general, apparently 
neutral law is adopted that nonetheless has the effect of favoring certain candidates 
over others.  If the law had no other justification, objectively conceived, than an 
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cerning themselves with the political interests of the poor, reduce campaign 
finance to special-interest politics.137  For example, Bradley Smith states: 
People favor campaign finance reform either because they believe that 
campaign contributions are frustrating other policy positions they 
prefer, or because they have a preconceived notion of how politics 
should work. . . .  Either way, their support for reform is based on 
substantive policy preferences and their goal is to silence those who 
disagree with those preferences.  Reform is not intended to be 
“neutral.”138 
Essentially, the Formalists distinguish between law and politics, and 
brand the Reformers’ insights as political claims unworthy of consideration 
in the Formalists’ more rarified First Amendment analysis.  By examining 
race, however, the Reformers could expose the questionable political 
assumptions upon which the Formalists base their analysis. 
By reading the First Amendment to prohibit certain restrictions on 
political money, Formalists assume (but generally do not explicitly state) that 
the existing distribution of property possesses some degree of legitimacy 
related to individual merit in the form of hard work, discipline, and 
intelligence.  Once the First Amendment ensures a fair and neutral process, 
differences in political outcomes reflect meaningful and legitimate 
differences in ideas and in the talent behind those ideas.139  Unhampered by 
 
interest in furthering one candidacy, then it would violate the principle of neutrality.  
But if its justification were to enhance the information available to the electorate, as 
indeed might be the case with expenditure limits, there would be no breach of the 
requisite neutrality. 
Fiss, supra note 47, at 2480.  See also Neuborne, supra note 35, at 1071 (“Finally, any 
program of reform must be relentlessly content-neutral.  Even a hint of government efforts to 
skew the political marketplace should invalidate the plan.”). 
137. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign 
Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 71 (1997) (arguing that “it seems doubtful that any reform measure would 
pass a content neutrality test” because reforms are “proposed precisely because certain ‘experts’ 
believe that some views—which they do not like—are heard too much, and others views—which 
they prefer—are heard too little”); see also HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: 
MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 15 (2d ed. 1980) (“Reform is not neutral.  When the 
rules of the game are changed, advantages shift and institutions change . . . .”); BeVier, supra note 
31, at 1062 (“[W]hatever the motivations of their political sponsors, laws directly regulating 
explicitly political behavior can never have a neutral impact. . . .  Statutes that are supported 
precisely because they deprive a particular group of its ability to engage relatively effectively in 
politics, therefore, may not be as ‘entirely content neutral’ as they seem.”); Smith, supra note 16, at 
1080 (observing that “[o]nce it is conceded that [campaign finance reform] legislation is intended to 
hamper the expression of some ideas and not others, it is difficult to assert that the regulation is 
content-neutral”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech: A Reply to Frank 
Askin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1998) (arguing that a purpose of campaign finance 
reform—equalizing access and influence—is not obviously content-neutral). 
138. Smith, supra note 137, at 71 n.180. 
139. Cf. id. at 95 (“By allowing monetary contributions, all persons have the opportunity to put 
their personal talents to use in the political arena.”). 
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government-imposed restrictions, the political marketplace guarantees that 
political outcomes reflect the collective wisdom of the best and the brightest. 
If the Formalists’ vision serves as the interpretive framework through 
which one understands the world, an application of First Amendment 
doctrine to limit political-money restrictions appears to be content-neutral 
and apolitical.  The Formalists’ rhetoric seems to be nonpartisan and 
inclusive of all.  Ignoring the relationship between past state-sponsored racial 
discrimination and the current distribution of property, Formalists support a 
system in which courts purport to give all citizens, including people of color, 
an equal opportunity to spend as much as they choose.140 
Although they have had some rhetorical success in cloaking their 
arguments with the appearance of objectivity and inevitability and in 
characterizing the Reformers as partisans,141 Formalists rely on their own 
political interpretations to give meaning to their understanding of rights.142  A 
more comprehensive vision of the world allows for an analysis of campaign 
finance law against the backdrop of property allocations that have been 
shaped by racial discrimination.  Even after the dissolution of racially 
discriminatory laws against people of color, the law has ratified the 
misallocation of property by protecting the settled expectations of those who 
obtained economic benefits under a discriminatory regime.143  Legal pro-
tection of those settled expectations, along with doctrines that build upon 
existing property rights (such as the First Amendment applications promoted 
by the Formalists), obscure continued privilege based on past discriminatory 
practices and make the existing economic order appear fair and equal.144  
 
140. Cf. Rhonda M. Williams & William E. Spriggs, How Does It Feel to be Free?: Reflections 
on Black-White Inequality in the Era of “Color-Blind” Law, 27 REV. BLACK POL. ECON., Summer 
1999, at 9, 10 (“Formal equality requires only . . . procedural equality. . . .  Like many human 
capital theorists, today’s judges lean toward the assumption that discrimination is not a significant 
social relation. Whatever role racism and discrimination have played historically in allocating the 
resources social competitors now bring to the game is none of the Courts’ business.”). 
141. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1351 (1988) (“The concept of 
hegemony allows Critical scholars to explain the continued legitimacy of American society by 
revealing how legal consciousness induces people to accept or consent to their own oppression.”); 
see also id. at 1370 (“Throughout American history, the subordination of Blacks was rationalized by 
a series of stereotypes and beliefs that made their conditions appear logical and natural.”). 
142. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363, 1363–64 (1984) (arguing 
that rights are unstable, produce indeterminate consequences, falsely convert valuable experiences 
into empty abstraction, and impede advances by progressive social forces). 
143. See Harris, supra note 79, at 1714 (“After legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness 
as property evolved into a more modern form through the law’s ratification of the settled 
expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.”).  In some situations, 
however, courts refuse to protect or ratify expectations in property acquired under a discriminatory 
regime.  See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948) (invalidating judicial enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants). 
144. See Harris, supra note 79, at 1777 (“The law masks what is chosen as natural; it obscures 
the consequences of social selection as inevitable.  The result is that the distortions in social 
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Spending and contributing political money are not prepolitical or natural 
liberties but are, instead, parasitic on positive law, including state-sponsored 
discrimination.145  Although courts developed the content-neutrality 
requirement as a judicial tool in interpreting the First Amendment to prevent 
the evil of viewpoint discrimination,146 Formalist arguments that base 
campaign finance on the existing distribution of property advance the po-
litical ideologies of those who have profited from the discriminatory 
misallocation of property.147  Past state-created advantages tend to allow 
individuals with certain racial backgrounds to obtain an unfair advantage in 
the political marketplace.148 
The Formalists may deny the relevance of race in defending their claim 
to objectivity and neutrality, but denials make their arguments no less 
political.  Some Formalists may contend that racial disparities in property 
holdings reflect a coincidental distribution based on individual merit and that 
it is thus fair to construct a campaign finance system based on private 
property.  Another group may claim that no manageable method of 
 
relations are immunized from truly effective intervention, because the existing inequities are 
obscured and rendered nearly invisible.”); William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate “Persons” 
and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 494, 510 
(stating that law is “not given the luxury of adopting a position which has no political 
consequences”). 
145. Frank I. Michelman, Process and Property in Constitutional Theory, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
577, 586 (1982) (observing that “the constitutional right of property is strictly parasitic on non-
constitutional positive law”).  In short, the Formalists constitutionalize rights that arise from laws 
that we would today consider unconstitutional. 
146. See Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 
68 GEO. L.J. 727, 735 (1980) (“Viewpoint-based discrimination is more clearly troublesome than 
subject-matter discrimination.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: 
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 108 (1978) (“[T]he 
Court’s rigorous approach to content-based restrictions stems in part from the realization that such 
restrictions have an especially potent content-differential impact upon the ‘marketplace of ideas.’. . .  
Although not without difficulties, viewpoint-neutral restrictions directed against all speech relating 
to an entire subject do not have the same sort of skewing effect on ‘the thinking process of the 
community’ as restrictions directed specifically against speech taking a particular side in an ongoing 
debate.”); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 
1009 (1976) (“The main evil against which rigorous First Amendment scrutiny is designed to guard 
is content discrimination—discrimination based on the message itself.”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing The Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
54, 67–75 (1997) (describing various tests used by the Court in interpreting constitutional doctrine). 
147. Cf. Johnson, supra note 80, at 529 n.20 (“Although the most invidious discrimination in 
the naturalization laws has been removed, the legacy of exclusion must be examined to ensure that 
its discriminatory influence can be extracted root and branch.”); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of 
Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1983) (explaining how past discrimination causes 
present injury and examining legal approaches aimed at preventing the perpetuation of racism). 
148. Cf. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990) (citing FEC v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (permitting restrictions on corporate 
expenditures in support of political candidates, reasoning that the state gives corporations special 
advantages in accumulating resources, and that these “state-created advantages” allow corporations 
“to use ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace’”). 
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accounting for the impact of past racial wrongs exists.  Thus, that group may 
choose to tolerate the status quo not only in the economic marketplace but 
also with regard to democratic participation under the current campaign 
finance system.  Others assert that proposed reforms will fail to address the 
problems of the existing system and will likely cause new problems.149  Some 
important scholars articulate these perspectives, and their insights should not 
be casually dismissed in making political judgments about campaign finance 
regulation.  Nevertheless, there is no apolitical, determinate organizing 
principle that mandates that society as a whole adopt these judgments to the 
exclusion of the historical and continuing relationship between race and 
private property.150  While supporters of a privately financed political system 
with minimal regulation may specify a vision of the world that tolerates the 
protection of participatory rights acquired due to past discriminatory policies, 
others should not be forced to embrace this normative interpretation. 
One problem with current jurisprudence, however, is that it limits the 
political understandings of the role of property by extending high con-
stitutional protection to property used in the campaign finance context.151  
While property rights shaped by racial discrimination are generally subject to 
legislative restriction and redistribution in the economic sphere,152 these same 
property rights are more absolute and impenetrable when exercised in the 
political context.153  Current campaign finance jurisprudence strictly protects 
 
149. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 12, at 1707 (arguing that “[reform] proposals may 
increase, rather than dampen, the role of money in politics” and make politics less accountable to 
democratic control).  But cf. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of 
All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 303–04 (1989) (arguing that opponents of 
reform have little empirical evidence to support their proposition that reforms “are far more likely to 
be harmful than beneficial,” and that there may be unanticipated consequences of maintaining the 
status quo). 
150. Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 141, at 1346 (“[L]aw itself does not dictate which of various 
visions will be adopted as an interpretive base. The choice between various visions and the values 
that lie within them is not guided by any determinate organizing principle.”). 
151. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386–88 (2000) (interpreting the 
appropriate standard for reviewing contribution limits as more stringent than intermediate scrutiny 
but “different” from the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits). 
152. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (upholding 
environmental regulations); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (allowing 
for legislative regulation of minimum wage); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388–90 
(1926) (allowing for legislative zoning); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (allowing for 
legislative rent control); Nat’l Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905) (allowing for 
legislative antitrust regulation). 
153. Cf. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 260 (1990) (“Why give 
up the overt formal limits [on the legislature] with respect to economic regulation and social 
assistance, and enforce the power and privilege of property against the egalitarian measures of 
campaign finance laws?”); Frank Michelman, Political Truth and the Rule of Law, 8 TEL AVIV U. 
STUD. IN LAW 281, 288 (1988) (asking why realism and relativism “have been such potent 
destroyers of juristic absolutism shielding the market manifestations of property rights against 
legislative control, but so impotent . . . when it comes to their manifestations in the political 
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the settled expectations of those who have benefited from illegitimate 
distributions of property and generally ignores those disadvantaged by 
illegitimate distributions.154 
The disparate judicial treatment of property in the economic and 
political spheres is made even more troubling by the fact that racial 
disparities are generally more tolerable in the economic sphere than the 
political sphere.155  While statutes prohibit racial discrimination in housing, 
employment, and other economic aspects of life, the law often tolerates racial 
disparities in these areas.156  Some commentators make seemingly persuasive 
arguments that economic markets should reward individual compliance with 
purportedly neutral merit-based criteria, regardless of context, history, and 
racial impact.157  In contrast, racial inclusion is affirmatively mandated in the 
political sphere by doctrines surrounding the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
Voting Rights Act.158  With regard to democratic exchange and governance, 
the need for commitment from a diverse, broad base of perspectives suggests 
that, to the greatest extent possible, we should prevent the effects of past 
state-sponsored discrimination from suppressing political participation.159  
While one might cite concerns about institutional competence to defend 
 
sphere”); Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1344–45 (1987) (“Why have realism and relativity been such potent destroyers 
of juristic absolutism regarding legislative control of the market manifestations of possessive 
property rights, while absolutism still shields their manifestations in the political sphere?”). 
154. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (“The ancillary interest in equalizing the 
relative financial resources . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the . . . infringement of 
fundamental First Amendment rights.”). 
155. Cf. Roy A. Schotland, Proposals for Campaign Finance Reform: An Article Dedicated to 
Being Less Dull Than Its Title, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 429, 435 (1992) (observing that a commitment 
to political equality coexists with acceptance of economic inequality). 
156. Cf. Spencer Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1541, 1545–51 (2001) (discussing the law’s tolerance for economic disparities caused 
by prior racial discrimination). 
157. See generally SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF 
RACE IN AMERICA (1990) (criticizing affirmative-action programs); STEPHAN THERNSTROM & 
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997) 
(same). 
158. See infra subpart V(A) (explaining that the Voting Rights Act fails to resolve all problems 
regarding race and campaign finance, but that the text and doctrine surrounding the statute are 
important in principle). 
159. Cf. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 242 (1987) (admitting that “[a] white 
denied a seat on a city council cannot claim entitlement on the ground of ‘merit’” and that 
“qualification for office is not measured by meritocratic standards in the customary sense”); Pamela 
S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) 
(arguing that “the Court’s attempt to integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to 
affirmative action is both misguided and incoherent” because “government decisionmaking with 
respect to voting, at least in its functional sense of rationing and apportioning the power to govern, 
is different from other governmental decisionmaking”); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action 
and Misrepresentation (pt. 2), 43 HOW. L.J. 405, 454–55 (2000) (criticizing the merit-based 
approach as applied to voting, distinguishing redistricting from employment, contracting, and 
college-admissions decisions). 
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judicial failure to mandate the elimination of campaign finance practices that 
disadvantage people of color, affirmative judicial obstruction of legislative 
actions that minimize such disadvantages raises serious questions.160 
B. Future Perpetuation of Racial Disparities 
By failing to acknowledge relevant racial realities, the Reformers miss a 
second critique: namely, that the existing campaign finance system per-
petuates racial disparities in the political distribution of societal resources.  In 
their class-based analyses, some Reformers point out that a primary role of 
the democratic decisionmaking process is to determine how wealth should be 
allocated.161  According to these commentators, the current campaign finance 
system gives wealthier individuals advantages in influencing democratic 
decisions regarding future allocations of wealth,162 thereby reinforcing the 
power of the affluent and the powerlessness of the poor.163  A more complete 
critique would observe that the existing campaign finance system not only 
solidifies the current class structure but also entrenches the economic status 
of particular racial groups within the current class structure. 
Race theorists have noted that legal doctrine helps to perpetuate racial 
hierarchy by protecting settled expectations shaped by a history of 
discrimination.164  Other race commentators have extended this critique by 
 
160. Cf. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the 
Judge in a Pluralist Society, 58 MD. L. REV. 150, 159 (1999) (asserting that the Court often 
privileges one epistemological framework over others in constructing its interpretation of the world, 
and calling on the Court both to employ other frameworks and to limit “its intrusions into the 
political sphere”). 
161. See Foley, supra note 36, at 1243 (“[N]o citizen has a valid claim to private property for 
the specific purpose of participating in the electoral process—because the electoral process itself 
determines the validity of all claims to private property.”). 
162. See id. at 1204 (“An important function of electoral politics is to determine how wealth 
should be distributed among society’s members.  The existing distribution of wealth at the time of 
any particular election should not affect the electorate’s determination of what the distribution 
should be henceforth.”). 
163. Reformers point out that “private campaign money is a principal means of reinforcing the 
powerlessness of less affluent citizens.”  Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 
37, at 1182; see also Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 301 (“The systemic 
degradation of the political influence of the nonaffluent is best witnessed by government policy.  
Congress is far more responsive to the political interests of the wealthy than the poor, and often acts 
to the detriment of those who do not participate in the wealth primary.  As political campaign costs 
and expenditures have soared in the last two decades, poor and working-class people have steadily 
lost economic ground, while wealthy individuals and corporations have been greatly enriched.”); 
NEDELSKY, supra note 153, at 260 (“Why . . . enforce the power and privilege of property against 
the egalitarian measures of campaign finance laws?  Perhaps the answers lie in what is actually a 
serious threat to that power and privilege.”).  The author has also examined economic entrenchment 
in the campaign finance context without discussing racial implications.  See Spencer Overton, 
Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1235, 1274–80 (2000). 
164. See Crenshaw, supra note 141, at 1383 (“The race neutrality of the legal system creates the 
illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the condition of the Black 
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observing that racial subjugation, even in the absence of race-conscious 
discrimination, is affirmatively exacerbated by structural phenomena, such as 
residential segregation and mortgage-lending decisions.165  The existing cam-
paign finance system is another structural device that works to perpetuate 
racial disparities.  Privately financed politics, framed by a history of facially 
discriminatory laws that have contributed to a present-day disparity in 
control over resources, reproduce and exacerbate racial disparities in the 
distribution of resources and political influence.  These increasing disparities, 
combined with numerical minority status, make people of color especially 
vulnerable in the current political system. 
1. Entrenching Inequality in the Absence of Discrimination.—Even in a 
world in which conscious racism against African Americans, Asian 
Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans has been eliminated, a privately 
financed political system perpetuates racial subjugation.  Political and eco-
nomic disadvantages persist despite the lack of formal prohibitions on the 
right of people of color to vote or contribute money.  Also, donors and 
politicians may act in a colorblind fashion yet perpetuate a process that 
systematically dilutes the economic and political influence of people of color. 
For example, envision a hypothetical society comprised of two groups, 
the Whites and the Browns.166  The Whites comprise a majority of the 
 
underclass. . . .”); Harris, supra note 79, at 1778 (“The property interest in whiteness . . . has . . . 
continued to distort outcomes of legal disputes by favoring and protecting settled expectations of 
white privilege.  The law expresses the dominant conception of ‘rights,’ ‘equality,’ ‘property,’ 
‘neutrality,’ and ‘power’: rights mean shields from interference; equality means formal equality; 
property means the settled expectations that are to be protected; neutrality means the existing 
distribution, which is natural; and, power is the mechanism for guarding all of this.”). 
165. See Banks, supra note 89, at 689–90 (arguing that “[b]ecause of historical discrimination, 
current racial disparities in mortgage lending and other areas could continue even in the complete 
absence of current discrimination”); Ford, supra note 84, at 1848.  Indeed, just as suburban 
communities are often racially segregated, exclusionary spaces that offer more extensive devices to 
protect the wealth of residents (e.g., greater educational opportunities, zoning designed to maintain 
property values), fundraising receptions are often racially segregated, exclusionary spaces that allow 
contributors to protect their wealth through access to government decisionmakers.  See id. at 1847 
(“[R]esidential segregation and . . . the geographic boundaries that define local governments . . . are 
not the only examples of racially identified space, [but] they are so intimately linked to issues of 
political and economic access that they are among the most important.”). 
166. See Ford, supra note 84, at 1849–52 (using a similar hypothetical to show the self-
sustaining nature of racial segregation in housing).  Some commentators reject group interests and 
rights, while others consider group association to be an essential component of individual political 
participation.  Compare Katherine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair 
Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 
621 n.72 (1995) (“Once we recognize that racial groups are entitled to be represented as racial 
groups, we are well on our way to enthroning group fairness, rather than individual merit, as the 
basis for all societal decisions.”), with Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The concept of ‘representation’ necessarily applies to 
groups: groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not.”).  Although this Article 
does not embrace either position as a normative goal, it recognizes that groups exist in politics as a 
descriptive matter; my purpose here is to examine the effect of a privately financed campaign 
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society’s population, and the Browns constitute a minority.  Due to historical 
discrimination in the hypothetical society, Browns generally control less 
wealth and earn less than Whites do.  The society recently realized that racial 
discrimination was wrong and has enacted a successful public education 
program that convinces all of its citizens of the impropriety of 
discrimination.  While all of the citizens are now colorblind, one must also 
assume that most remain concerned about their own financial security and 
that they will act accordingly.  Consequently, political decisions will tend to 
favor the economic interests of predominantly White political communities 
that can afford to contribute money (for example, by enacting lower 
inheritance taxes, allowing tax deductions for business lunches, and basing 
educational funding on revenue from local property taxes).  At the same 
time, due to the inability of the Browns to participate in the current campaign 
finance system, it is probable that future lawmaking will steer finite societal 
resources and opportunities away from them. 
An argument that this is simply a “class” problem and that, over time, 
wealth disparities will even out between the Brown and White communities 
is flawed.  An assumption that members of Brown communities will start 
supporting particular policies in the same proportion as the White political 
community once wealth disparities even out relies on the belief that wealth 
disparities will naturally disappear on their own.  Due to privately financed 
politics, however, past racial distributions of wealth will impact present 
racial distributions of wealth, and present distributions will impact future 
distributions.  Every generation would be influenced by the racial disparities 
of previous generations, even though this structure can be described without 
using the term “racism.” 
The fact that such racially disparate allocations of property could flow 
from decisions made with a complete disregard for race confirms the 
proposition that privately financed politics reaffirms past racially discrim-
inatory public and private decisions.  The campaign finance system allows 
racial subordination to take on a life of its own. 
2. Entrenching Inequality in a Political System Influenced by Racial 
Identity.—Imagine inserting a few real-world difficulties into the 
hypothetical.  Perhaps racial group identity is a significant part of political 
activity; just as racial bloc voting exists, racial bloc contributing exists.167  
 
system on the shared political interests of individuals who have been disadvantaged by past 
discrimination.  Cf. FRANK MICHELMAN, BRENNAN ON DEMOCRACY 123 (1999) (asserting that a 
consideration of fact (as perceived) about “the communal bases of individual identities . . . does not 
in any way contradict . . . normative individualism”). 
167. See JOHN THEILMANN & AL WILHITE, DISCRIMINATION AND CONGRESSIONAL 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 78 (1991).  The authors contend: 
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Under such a scenario, ninety percent of White contributors give only to 
White candidates, and ninety-five percent of Brown contributors give only to 
Brown candidates.168  Because Whites have more money, give larger 
contributions, and are twenty-five times more likely to give money than are 
Browns, White candidates receive many more contributions than Brown 
candidates do.169  Also, imagine that many electoral districts are based on 
municipal boundaries and that the municipalities are, due to historical 
factors, racially segregated.170  An overwhelming majority of Brown 
candidates run in these predominantly Brown districts.  The donations White 
contributors give to Brown candidates are overwhelmingly directed to 
incumbents.171 
Under these conditions, the campaign finance system would affect the 
participation of Brown citizens even more adversely.  It is likely that because 
of the financial dominance of the White donors, their contributions will form 
a large majority of the money received by the Brown incumbents, despite the 
fact that most contributions from Whites continue to go to Whites.172  Brown 
incumbents from Brown districts will face insignificant challenges from 
underfunded insurgents—who will usually be Browns—in either primary or 
 
[T]here does seem to be a pattern of racial discrimination in the allocation of total 
campaign contributions.  After controlling for attributes such as candidate strength, 
opposition strength, party affiliation, and the incumbency advantage, black candidates 
received substantially lower levels of funds than did nonblack candidates.  Because the 
primary determinants of candidates’ fund-raising abilities are included in the analysis, 
the differential appears to be racially motivated. 
Id. 
168. Cf. Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 960 F. Supp. 515, 519 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(noting that Hispanic candidates frequently ranked first in preference among Hispanic voters but 
ranked much lower among non-Hispanic white voters, who preferred white candidates); Smith v. 
Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (observing that in the 1988 primary election for 
the state legislature, almost 100% of African American voters supported the African American 
candidate, while 93% of white voters supported the white candidate). 
169. Cf. THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 167, at 152–53 (finding that African American 
candidates generally received significantly less money from large individual contributions (those 
greater than $500) and African American incumbents typically received less money from political 
action committees, resulting in African American candidates’ receiving from “$7,000 to almost 
$30,000 less through the 1980s”). 
170. Cf. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL BRIEF: POVERTY AREAS 1 (1995), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/statbriefs/povarea.html (observing that “[f]our times as 
many Blacks and three times as many Hispanics lived in poverty areas than lived outside them”). 
171. Cf. Robert C. Smith, Financing Black Politics: A Study of Congressional Elections, 17 
REV. OF BLACK POL. ECON., Summer 1988, 5, 24 (1988) (observing that “it is clear that whites 
rarely wish to support black challengers in black congressional elections”). 
172. Id. (“Congressional elections in the black community tend to be financed largely by white 
dominated PACs and disproportionately by large (probably white) contributors . . . .”); ROBERT 
SINGH, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 125–26 
(1998) (“The funding of black campaigns remains substantially the province of political actors 
external to black communities. . . .  Without exception, over every congressional election cycle, 
CBC members raise more funds from PACs alone than their challengers raise from all sources 
combined.”). 
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general elections.173  Because of this trend, little democratic dialogue about 
policy will take place in Brown communities.174  White contributors will 
fund incumbents from both predominantly White and predominantly Brown 
districts, and Brown communities will lack similar connections to any 
incumbents.  Due to the geographic segregation, many government 
decisions—such as localized education with funding based on municipal 
boundaries—will have an even more substantial impact on the distribution of 
resources.  Also, because Brown incumbents, like other politicians, have an 
interest in being reelected, only a few will seriously attempt to disrupt the 
existing allocation of resources and threaten the contribution stream that 
gives them an advantage over challengers.175 
3. Private Money Is Most Harmful to “Discrete and Insular” 
Minorities.—The cycle described above, in which the existing campaign 
finance system perpetuates racial disparities in economic resources, 
constitutes a failure of the political process even more troubling than the 
failure described by the Reformers.  Many Reformers criticize the existing 
campaign finance system as a flawed process that allows an upper-class 
minority to abuse the interests of lower- and middle-class majorities.176  In 
the form of a “Carolene Products/John Hart Ely” critique, some observe 
“that the political process itself is flawed or defective when large sums of 
money can be used to influence legislators under the guise of freedom of 
association, or influence voters under the guise of freedom of speech.”177 
 
173. Cf. SINGH, supra note 172, at 125 (noting that “[i]n 1994, the average challenger to a CBC 
incumbent spent 23.8% of the amount spent by the incumbent”); Smith, supra note 171, at 16 (“It 
appears that the financial and other advantages of incumbency (name recognition, constituency 
service, media access, etc.), the relatively small stratum of politically active citizens in the districts, 
the relatively low income status of black voters, the one-party dominance in the districts and the 
disproportionate dependence of black congressional campaigns on externally generated PAC money 
operate to create near permanency of tenure for black members of Congress.”). 
174. Cf. Smith, supra note 171, at 25 (Recognizing that the “tendency of campaign contributors 
to discriminate against challengers . . . puts a burden on the black community because it is deprived 
of a robust, competitive debate in its politics”). 
175. But cf. SINGH, supra note 172, at 129–31 (observing that due to high incumbency rates, 
African American representatives may be able to acquire more seniority in Congress and be more 
overtly partisan and radical). 
176. See, e.g., Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 277 (“[T]he tyranny of 
private money corrupts the democratic relationship of one person/one vote . . . by assuring that 
wealthy interests will set the parameters of political debate and the nature of the legislative agenda. 
Not surprisingly, the nonaffluent majority continues to lose ground in public policy and turn away 
in disgust from the political system.”). 
177. Balkin, supra note 42, at 378 (“This line of arguments critiques the ‘money as speech’ 
position taken in cases like Buckley v. Valeo.  It argues that regulation of campaign finance is 
necessary because what passes for free speech is really more like unregulated economic power that 
is used to influence (and corrupt) the political process.” (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–34 (1980))). 
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This phenomenon is even more pronounced, however, when one 
examines the interests of many racial minorities in relation to those who both 
control greater wealth per capita and represent a numerical majority.178  
Courts and commentators have paid special attention to laws that 
disadvantage discrete and insular minorities in the political process.179  
Democracy is said to malfunction when an effective majority—either direct-
ly or through its representatives—systematically and unfairly uses the power 
of government to burden or disenfranchise a political minority.180  The 
Formalists’ application of the First Amendment in the campaign finance 
context is more problematic for many Browns than for many lower- and 
middle-class Whites in the above hypothetical for two reasons related to 
minority status. 
First, the Browns would not be protected by the formal political 
defenses that buffer less wealthy racial majorities against abuses by wealthy 
contributors.  If contributors were to go too far or be too obvious in their 
abuse of the White majority, then the contributors could be exposed by the 
press, and less wealthy Whites could self-interestedly vote against the 
proposals of the wealthy.  Browns, on the other hand, are the numerical 
minority in many county, state, and federal elections, and could not use the 
formal vote to defend their particular interests to a similar extent.181  Granted, 
the vote would have limited utility for the Whites against the abuses of 
money due to a number of factors (including imperfect information182 and 
lack of meaningful choice), because all viable candidates may have received 
 
178. Some might argue that there are only a small number of whites acting to disadvantage 
people of color.  The fact, however, that only a minority of whites owned slaves or owned stores 
that would not cater to people of color does not make the discriminatory effect any less pronounced. 
179. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; ELY, supra note 177, at 105–34; cf. Foley, 
supra note 36, at 1222 (“Now, the rich may argue that they need extra voting rights to protect their 
greater wealth from the self-interested designs of the poor but that the poor need less protection 
because they have so much less to lose. This argument, however, must fail because it presumes that 
the rich are entitled to protect their wealth against redistributivist efforts by the poor (and the middle 
class).  Whether the rich have a valid claim to the wealth they possess is precisely the issue to be 
decided by the decision-making process.”). 
180. ELY, supra note 177, at 103; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . 
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens.”). 
181. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
152 (1976) (asserting that African Americans have not prospered through the American democratic 
process because “they are a numerical minority,” have a low “economic status,” and, as “discrete 
and insular” minorities, suffer prejudice that impairs them in forming coalitions with others). 
182. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in “Faulty Assumptions”: A Response to 
Professor Smith’s Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 879–80 (1998) 
(arguing that legislatures consider many specialized issues that arouse little public interest). 
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money from and support a particular interest of the wealthy.183  Further, if the 
abuse of the Browns by wealthy interests were sufficiently obvious, the 
Browns may be able to appeal to the moral conscience of the White majority 
and build a political coalition.  Nevertheless, voting strength would not shield 
the interests of the Browns to the same degree that it would for less wealthy 
Whites. 
Second, outside of the voting context, middle- and lower-class Whites, 
in part because of their sheer numbers, collectively control more resources 
than Browns do.  While lower- and middle-class Whites could not play the 
money game to the same degree that wealthy Whites could, they would be 
able, if necessary, to draw upon more resources to defend their interests.184  
Brown citizens, both because they control fewer resources per capita and 
because they are numerical minorities, would not be able to defend all of 
their interests to the same degree.  For this reason, the privately financed 
system would adversely affect the political interests not only of impoverished 
Browns but also of Brown citizens who are not as impoverished.  For 
example, some Browns might have a higher household income than Whites 
do, but they might make up only four percent of the population.185  
Therefore, while these wealthier Browns may be able to make meaningful 
contributions in support of class interests shared by the wealthy of different 
races, the Browns may be less able to use money to advance any particular 
political interests they may have that are related to race.  Even if the 
wealthier Browns gave twice as much as others, their contributions would 
constitute only eight percent of total contributions,186 an amount unlikely to 
carry great weight for real change when pitted against the overwhelming 
amount of contributions coming from Whites and the potential xenophobia of 
the general population as a whole.187 
 
183. Cf. Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 309 (describing the 
“extraordinary correlation between candidates who are wealthy primary winners and those who are 
general election winners”). 
184. These resources might manifest themselves either directly (e.g., contributions of money) 
or indirectly (e.g., a news program is more likely to focus on an issue that impacts a large number of 
people, in part because such an issue will attract more viewers and increase advertising revenues). 
185. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, P60-200, MONEY 
INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 (With Separate Data on Valuation of Noncash Benefits), at 
ix (1998) (“Asians and Pacific Islanders continued to have the highest median household income 
($45,249) among the race groups in 1997.  Whites had the second highest ($38,972) followed by 
Black households ($25,050).”); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1 (1999) (reporting that 
Asian Americans make up 4% of the total U.S. population). 
186. Cf. Wang, supra note 74, at 339 (“John Huang was responsible for raising $3.5 million, a 
minuscule amount when compared to the $2.2 billion raised in the last federal elections.”). 
187. Note that even though some Asian Americans control significant resources, fear of 
enhanced scrutiny and allegations of attempts to buy influence on behalf of foreign interests may 
discourage Asian Americans from making contributions.  See id. at 330–31 (“The media began 
employing terms such as the ‘Asian connection’ and ‘Asian Americans’ as synonymous with 
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The minority status of the Browns would make them especially prone to 
mistreatment in the current political system because they have both fewer 
votes and fewer economic resources than others in our hypothetical society.  
These disadvantages would do more than increase the probability that the 
numerical racial majorities would unfairly use the power of government to 
disenfranchise the Browns.188  The disadvantages also make it more likely 
that wealthy, overwhelmingly White contributors would use their political 
money to effectuate government decisions, such as the location of toxic 
waste storage, in a way that burdens populations without the political tools to 
defend their interests.189 
Some might assert that even if courts were more tolerant of legislative 
reforms, the Whites in our hypothetical society would not support campaign 
finance reform under these facts.  If the current system allows Whites to 
obtain political decisions that favor their own economic interests, some might 
argue, then it is unlikely that many Whites would support campaign finance 
reform that would mitigate the political advantages they enjoy over the 
Browns.190  Such a result is possible, but the mere possibility of inaction 
should not obstruct the alteration of current jurisprudence for a number of 
reasons.  First, as with civil-rights legislation following Brown v. Board of 
 
political corruption and foreign subversion of the political process, even though Huang and Trie 
raised only about $4.5 million out of the total of $2.2 billion raised in the 1996 federal elections.”); 
James Sterngold, For Asian-Americans, A New Political Resolve, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at 
A1, LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File (observing that “many Asian-Americans feel that the fund-
raising scandals put anyone with an Asian surname under a humiliating cloud of suspicion—with 
many perfectly legitimate donors receiving calls from the F.B.I.”). 
188. Cf. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 177–78 (3d ed. 1992) 
(“[B]lacks, while citizens, are always subject to ‘democratic domination’; their views, aspirations, 
even basic political rights subject to the prevailing belief that America, and every part of it, must be 
controlled by whites.”); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 710 (1995) (“The implication of the failure to protect blacks 
from the tyrannical majority is that the majority rule of whites over African-Americans is, morally 
speaking, illegitimate.”); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For Political Equality, 77 
VA. L. REV. 1413, 1479 (1991) (“[R]acism excludes minorities from ever becoming part of the 
governing coalition, meaning that the white majority will be permanent. . . .  [S]uch a majority will 
‘marginalize’ or ignore minority interests altogether.”). 
189. Cf. Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the 
Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1230–31 (1998) (observing that “environmental decision-
making is already stacked against the country’s minorities, who as a group have fewer resources and 
less political representation with which to fund, research, and otherwise influence the environmental 
prioritization” (quoting Peter M. Manus, The Owl, the Indian, the Feminist, and the Brother: 
Environmentalism Encounters the Social Justice Movements, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 249, 
285–86 (1996))). 
190. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, Redistributive Values and the Democratic 
Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (1999) (“If, under existing political structures, society will 
not even place the issue of substantive economic redistribution on the political agenda because those 
in political power are the very same individuals and entities who currently possess economic power, 
why are those very same power centers any more likely to place the issue of democratic 
redistribution on the political agenda?”). 
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Education,191 legislative institutions often glean lessons from judicial 
pronouncements, and if courts were to acknowledge that money is not speech 
but in fact has property characteristics that dilute the political influence of 
historically disadvantaged Browns, public lawmaking may respond by 
supporting reform.  Second, it is possible that a White majority would favor 
reform that mitigated political advantages enjoyed by the very wealthy, even 
if that reform also effectively mitigated the racial disparities between the 
White majority and the Brown minority.192  Third, the fact that powerful 
interests might decide to use the political process to block campaign finance 
reform should not provide cover for judges who use the judicial process to 
arrive at the same political result.193 
Unexamined by the Reformers, the existing campaign finance system 
has profound consequences for race relations in America.  Privately financed 
politics, framed by a history of facially discriminatory laws that have 
contributed to a present-day disparity in control over resources, reproduces 
racial disparities in the distribution of resources.  Campaign finance doctrine 
plays a significant part in maintaining the racial allocation of economic and 
political resources.194 
C. Slippery Slopes 
One might accept the fact that current campaign finance jurisprudence 
lacks neutrality and affirmatively exacerbates racial disparities, yet still 
contend that heavy judicial scrutiny of legislative regulation is necessary 
because any other path would lead to state regulation of other constitutionally 
protected liberties.  Rights to legal counsel, abortion, and contraception, as 
well as freedoms of religion and of the press, often depend, in part, on the 
use of financial resources.  Recognizing that past discriminatory policies 
have shaped the existing distribution of resources, the logic advanced in this 
Article might allow for legislatures to mitigate racial disparities by limiting 
the amount individuals can spend in exercising these various liberties.195  
 
191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
192. Cf. BELL, supra note 188, at 50 (“[P]rogress will occur for [African Americans] only if 
most whites perceive that their interests will benefit or not suffer any serious loss.”). 
193. Note that instead of refusing to adopt reforms, it is possible that powerful interests 
(including, but not limited to, racial groups) might enact enrichment-minded campaign finance 
legislation.  Judicial adoption of a test that invalidates entrenching reform could deal with this 
problem.  See Overton, supra note 163, at 1299–302 (2000) (describing a judicial test in which 
courts strictly scrutinize campaign finance reform found to cause entrenchment). 
194. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Color Blindness, History, and the Law, in THE HOUSE 
THAT RACE BUILT: BLACK AMERICANS, U.S. TERRAIN 285 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1997) 
(observing that “[f]ormal equality in conditions of social inequality becomes a tool of domination, 
reinforcing that system and insulating it from attack”). 
195. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Unintended Consequences of Three Proposals, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 47, 59 (2000) (“Say that the fact that ‘money is property, it is not speech’ means the 
government has a fairly free hand in restricting your using money to speak.  [This logic] would then 
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Many individuals exercise constitutional liberties on a platform of 
background rules that are indeterminate and political, and if the background 
rules were constantly subject to question, all such liberties would be 
jeopardized.  While the status quo’s reliance upon the existing distribution of 
property may be imperfect, one might argue it at least provides a workable 
baseline for the allocation of privileges in society.196 
This subpart does not purport to ultimately resolve the questions of 
whether and how to limit the consideration of past discrimination to the 
exercise of liberties in the campaign finance context.  Drawing lines is 
admittedly very difficult, for as articulated below, there are good reasons to 
consider past discrimination in analyzing the exercise of other liberties.  
Instead, this subpart attempts to parse out distinctions that explain why the 
racial distribution of property is uniquely disturbing in the campaign finance 
context.  Those who are reluctant to consider race outside of the campaign 
finance context will hopefully find comfort in the realization that the drawing 
of doctrinal boundaries is both theoretically and practically feasible. 
A potential critique of considering race in the campaign finance context 
notes that past state-sponsored discrimination that has shaped the distribution 
of property also interferes with the ability of people of color to exercise 
liberties related to counsel, privacy, and religion.  Just as past discrimination 
shapes disparities in campaign contributions and expenditures, it may also 
contribute to racial disparities in criminal convictions, out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies, and other social circumstances.  Therefore, one would argue, 
courts might extend the consideration of race to allow legislatures to 
diminish racial disparities by restricting the amounts that individuals can 
spend on liberties related to counsel, privacy, and religion. 
Legislative restrictions, however, would not help people of color to 
more effectively exercise liberties such as the right to criminal counsel, 
privacy, or religious freedom.197  Unlike the expenditure of money on speech, 
 
equally enable the government to restrict your using money to get abortions, buy contraceptives, 
send your kids to private schools, hire a lawyer, or build a church.”). 
196. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 1386 (arguing that “[t]he market ordering is preferable not 
because it is theoretically good but because the market—which reflects the decisions of many 
people, acting for different purposes—is not subject to some of the ends that can result when a 
decision is made by a single, purposive actor like the government”). 
197. Reparation payments may help people of color to exercise these liberties more effectively.  
Unfortunately, in describing harms that result from past discrimination, many who call for 
reparation payments overlook the fact that people of color are less able to use resources to exercise 
constitutional liberties.  See Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities, Campaign Finance, and the 
Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (asserting that those who 
advocate for reparations should more specifically articulate political harms that arise from past 
discrimination, including interference with the ability to exercise rights to speech, counsel, press, 
and petition); cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (“Equality in the enjoyment of property rights 
was regarded by the framers of [the Fourteenth] Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the 
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the expenditure of money by white individuals to exercise liberties related to 
counsel, privacy, and religion does not generally interfere with the ability of 
people of color to effectively exercise these same liberties.198  Granted, a 
greater percentage of whites than people of color may be able to afford to 
exercise these liberties, and limits on the amount that individuals could spend 
on such liberties might narrow racial disparities.  Such limits, however, 
would not enhance the ability of people of color to effectively exercise these 
liberties.  Unlike speech, the rights to criminal counsel, privacy, and religious 
freedom do not involve a “distinctive role in the political process”199 so that 
those who spend money obtain advantages in securing political decisions that 
bind those who cannot afford to spend money. 
Distinctions between money spent on campaign speech and other types 
of speech are not as apparent.  A Formalist might argue that adopting this 
Article’s framework will lead to judicial deference to statutes that restrict the 
amount that an individual can spend to publish a book of poetry, make a 
movie about the Holocaust, or produce any other type of speech.  Indeed, 
race theorists might assert that courts should not limit the analysis articulated 
in this Article to money used on campaign speech, as other types of ex-
pensive speech shape citizens’ understanding of racial reality in the United 
States.  Past discrimination has created racial disparities in wealth so that 
whites disproportionately own and control book publishing companies, 
recording companies, movie studios, and other major entities that produce 
expression.  Through the media’s barrage of stereotypical images related to 
language, conduct, and values, these entities enjoy significant influence not 
simply over government policy, but also over the meaning of racial identity 
(as understood by people of color as well as by whites).200  People of color 
 
realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to 
guarantee.”). 
198. Note some individuals’ relative willingness to spend more may sometimes inflate the cost 
of the best attorneys, doctors, and contraceptives, putting such resources out of the financial reach 
of many people of color.  Outside of the nature of economic markets, however, criminal defense 
counsel, privacy, and religion differ from property, speech, and political money, as the latter group 
may be used in ways that interfere with the ability of others to effectively exercise the same 
liberties.  See Overton, supra note 163, at 1265 (“Like both property and speech, political money 
can be used to interfere with the interests of others.”). 
199. RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 329–30 (1993) 
(asserting that his fairness principles do not extend to religious liberties because they do not 
constitute a “distinctive role in the political process”). 
200. Some race theorists have rejected the near absolute judicial protection of hate speech and 
other racially demeaning messages, arguing that the power of racist cultural messages should be 
curtailed in light of context, history, and politics.  See generally MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS 
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
(1993); Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First Amendment, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
778, 779 (2000) (book review) (“Under the influence of radical feminism and critical race theory, 
this last remnant of 1890s mechanical jurisprudence is beginning to give way to a view of speech 
that is flexible, policy-sensitive, and mindful of communication theory, politics, and setting.”); 
Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal Realism, 
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are unable to counter these images effectively in the marketplace of ideas 
because they do not control sufficient resources either to dictate alternative 
programming through media ownership or to form a high-end target audience 
for advertisers.201  Society should not force people of color to bear the costs 
of free speech disproportionately.202 
While these harms are real and should not be overlooked, money spent 
on election-oriented speech—that which refers to or features a likeness of a 
clearly identified candidate or a ballot initiative—is used in a unique 
context.203  The government has created the electoral process, and unlike the 
money spent on other types of speech, money spent on election-related 
speech is directly targeted to influence outcomes in this governmentally 
created institution.204  The government should be able to determine the 
legitimacy of the tools used to influence outcomes in the governmentally 
created electoral process, and should be able to reject or restrict the use of the 
tools, such as private wealth, that individuals acquire in part due to obsolete 
and discarded discriminatory government policies.  Further, movies and 
books may abstractly impact the lives of people of color, but the integrity of 
the electoral process is arguably more important because it produces 
quantifiable laws that legally bind all citizens.  Finally, as stated above in 
subpart IV(B), the electoral process directly shapes the existing allocation of 
 
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1994); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: 
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.  The problem arises, however, not 
simply from the images themselves, but also from the inability of people of color to counter 
derogatory images with more constructive images, which arises in large part from disparities of 
property gained through a history of state-sponsored racial discrimination. 
201. Cf. Kurt A. Wimmer, The Future of Minority Advocacy Before the FCC: Using 
Marketplace Rhetoric To Urge Policy Change, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 133, 141–42 (1989) (“All 
viewers are not valued equally by advertisers.  [A] large audience may be desirable, prompting 
programmers to tailor programming to . . . majority interests . . . .  [A] small, high-income 
demographic may be desirable, prompting programmers to tailor programming to the young, white 
audience . . . .  Under either scenario, minority audiences are disenfranchised.”). 
202. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1357 (1992) 
(arguing that “the immediate fact that the cost of a constitutional right is being borne 
disproportionately by victims of its exercise ought at least to occasion more thought, especially in 
the First Amendment area, than it has to date”). 
203. Foley, supra note 36, at 1249–50 (“Equal-dollars-per-voter applies only to electoral 
activities, which I have defined to consist of activities in support of, or opposition to, a candidate or 
ballot initiative.”); C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 50 (1998) (“This category of expenditures would include all specifically campaign-
oriented advertising within the media.  It would also include groups’ special attempts to spread an 
electoral message beyond their membership or usual audience, for example, broader than usual 
distribution of the organization’s own media.  This category, however, should cover only overtly 
election-oriented speech.”). 
204. See Baker, supra note 203, at 48 (“By creating elections, the state creates not only the 
opportunity to run but also the opportunity to influence the legal output of elections . . . [and] the 
institutionalization of elections can justify regulating behavior specifically directed at influencing 
these outcomes—for example, speech that is purposefully part of, not a reaction to or critique of, the 
process the state has created.”). 
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resources, and thus the spending of political money can result in laws that 
perpetuate racial disparities in wealth.205 
Even if one accepts the distinctions between money spent on election-
related speech and money spent to produce speech generally, the rationale 
advanced in this Article might be said to justify limits on the amounts of 
money spent by the press on election-related speech, such as endorsements, 
editorials, and news reports that discuss candidates or ballot initiatives.206  
Alternatively, the rationale put forth in this Article might allow the 
government to mandate that the press provide a right of access to those who 
cannot otherwise afford to reach a broad audience.207  Distinguishing 
between the press and other entities in restricting spending on election-
related speech is difficult, as news outlets are disproportionately owned and 
controlled by individuals who have not been disadvantaged by past racial 
discrimination.  There are serious questions as to why this select group of 
individuals, simply because they own a particular type of property, should 
have a greater opportunity to influence the governmentally created electoral 
process, and shape the laws that bind all Americans and allocate resources.208  
Despite claims to the contrary, many media outlets are not objective or 
impartial, but seek to maximize either their political influence or their profits 
by expanding their market share, which often comes at the expense of the 
interests of many people of color.209  One might argue, therefore, that courts 
 
205. Cf. Overton, supra note 163, at 1291–92 n.222 (“Allowing for more regulation of political 
money does not necessitate a doctrinal change that allows for the regulation of . . . other 
property/speech intersections. . . .  Political money is different for a number of reasons, including 
but not limited to the entrenching impact of the existing uneven distribution of property on future 
allocations of property (through lawmaking).”). 
206. Cf. Volokh, supra note 195, at 58 (arguing that “under [the money as property] approach, 
the government would acquire broad power to control newspapers . . . and anyone else who hires 
others to participate in creating a speech product”); Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign 
Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 939, 946–48 (1985) (“To the extent 
that it strikes us as dubious—or indeed ‘unthinkable’—to limit the ability of a newspaper to 
campaign actively for its favorite candidates, then we should at least question why it would be any 
more legitimate to limit the amount of spending by an individual eager to support the same 
candidate.”). 
207. Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (finding a Florida 
statute that granted a political candidate the “right to reply” to press criticism with equal space in a 
newspaper violated the First Amendment), with Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395–96 
(1969) (finding that the federal “fairness doctrine” did not violate the First Amendment by requiring 
“a radio or television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and political editorials”). 
208. Cf. Foley, supra note 36, at 1252 (“The owners of newspapers should have no greater 
opportunity, simply by virtue of owning this property, than any other citizen to attempt to persuade 
undecided voters how to vote on election day.”); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and 
the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1627, 1665 (1999) (“But if we one day come so 
far as to be able to regulate political equality generally through our campaign finance laws, it seems 
anomalous to exempt Rupert Murdoch, defense contractors, Mickey Mouse and a host of other 
characters simply because they used their wealth to buy a newspaper or broadcast station.”). 
209. Cf. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 5 (5th ed. 1997) (asserting that 
individuals purchase news outlets for either monetary profit or political influence); Hasen, supra 
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would extend the concepts in this Article to empower legislatures to place 
restrictions on the amount the media spends on election-related speech. 
Despite the fact that past discrimination may adversely impact 
minorities in their ability to own and control news outlets, there also seem to 
be reasons to distinguish the use of political money from expenditures by the 
press.  The media plays an important role in democracy that differs from the 
role played by those who finance political advertisements.  A media com-
pany does not simply spend resources on expression during election time to 
further its own political interests, but it is in the regular business of imparting 
news and opinion to the public.210  A media outlet is not merely a platform 
for its owner, but also often provides a forum for the perspectives of various 
individuals, including people of color.  Media outlets also expose and check 
government abuses.211  While those who give or spend large sums of political 
money could theoretically perform the same function, in practice they often 
facilitate abuses and entrench their own interests, which generally do not 
further and are often counter to the interests of those who have suffered from 
past discrimination.  In addition, one might argue that the text of the 
Constitution distinctly and more expansively protects press freedoms.212 
Admittedly, the theoretical distinctions between the campaign finance 
context and the exercise of other liberties may appear result-oriented, as a 
single, overarching, and neutral principle does not bind them all together.  In 
practice, one might argue, the distinctions are subjective, value-laden, and 
temporary.  Once courts consider past discrimination and allow for more ex-
 
note 208, at 1630–31 (examining “the evidence indicating that media owners are profit or influence 
maximizers”). 
210. Cf. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 667 (1990) (observing that 
“media corporations differ significantly from other corporations in that their resources are devoted 
to the collection of information and its dissemination to the public”); Baker, supra note 203, at 49 
(“The press (newspapers and other on-going media, in contrast to special partisan media created just 
for the period of the campaign and designed just to influence the campaign) must be allowed to 
engage in unrestricted campaign coverage and comment, including endorsements. . . .  Any attempt 
to restrict these activities would go beyond campaign regulation and intrude into politics in the 
wider sense.”); Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating 
Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 6 n.16 
(2001) (distinguishing regulation of corporate election-related spending from state censorship of 
editorializing by media enterprises, and arguing that “[e]ditorializing is the very business of the 
media” and that shareholders in such corporations “can be more accurately described as having 
authorized the use of corporate resources for political speech”). 
211. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves and was designed to 
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a 
constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the 
people whom they were selected to serve.”). 
212. Cf. Hasen, supra note 39, at 1657 (“In addition, the media could argue that the 
Constitution separately, and more generously, protects freedom of the press compared to freedom of 
speech.”); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“The publishing 
business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional 
protection.”). 
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tensive regulation in the campaign finance sphere, government will attempt 
to restrict other liberties, and courts will cede to these demands. 
These dangers, however, are remote.  Existing campaign finance 
statutes already limit contributions that individuals may make to candidates 
and prohibit corporations and unions from making contributions to 
candidates or spending money in connection with candidate elections.213  
These laws have not inspired legislatures to limit the amount the press spends 
on election-related speech or the amount an individual spends to exercise 
other liberties, such as religious freedoms.214  Further, legislatures can enact 
reasonable regulations for obscenity and other types of speech only because 
courts have engaged in subjective, value-laden line drawing,215 and such 
distinctions have not led to a judicial disregard for expressive liberties 
generally.216  In short, rhetorical fears about slippery slopes should not 
impede one’s willingness to consider race in the campaign finance context. 
V. The Consideration of Race in Looking Toward Solutions 
This Article has explored assumptions about the political realities of 
democracy embedded in the Reformers’ critique of current constitutional 
jurisprudence and how these perspectives overlook important historical and 
contemporary factors related to race and the distribution of property.  But 
even if courts were to give greater deference to the political branches with 
regard to campaign finance, detailed and effective legislative solutions would 
come only through broader discussions that incorporate a more com-
prehensive analysis of race into the campaign finance debate.  To spark con-
versations that will eventually lead to more appropriate remedies, this Part 
builds on the previous sections by sketching out some initial strategies in 
approaching race and campaign finance reform and addresses some of the 
concerns with such strategies.  First, however, this Part explains why the 
 
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (modified 1976, recodified at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441a(a)(1)(A)) (prohibiting an individual from giving more than $1000 to a particular candidate 
per election); 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (“It is unlawful for any . . . corporation . . . or labor organization to 
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election . . . .”). 
214. Cf. Hasen, supra note 208, at 1658 (“Many laws already in existence govern if and how 
non-media entities may contribute to or make independent expenditures in connection with federal 
candidates. These laws have not led to widespread censorship in other areas of political life . . . .”). 
215. Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Frederick Schauer, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 1803, 1826 (1999) (“With these slogans and metaphors, the 
tradition encourages avoiding even independently justifiable regulations of communications for fear 
of being unable to draw the line between the justifiable and the unjustifiable, and for fear of a causal 
relationship between justifiable regulation now and unjustifiable regulation later.”). 
216. Cf. id. at 1828 (“In permitting the regulation of commercial advertising under standards 
that are more easily satisfied than the standards for the regulation of “core” First Amendment 
speech, the Supreme Court has relied on a boundary between commercial advertising and other 
speech that is no more clear and impermeable than a putative boundary between electoral speech 
and other forms of political speech.”). 
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most relevant existing legal directive, the Voting Rights Act, does not 
adequately resolve the problems surrounding race and campaign finance. 
A. The Voting Rights Act 
Although racial exclusion in the political sphere motivated its passage, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does not comprehensively remedy such 
exclusion in the campaign finance context.  The Voting Rights Act prohibits 
not only restrictions intentionally designed to deny minorities the formal 
right to vote217 but also electoral practices that have the effect218 of denying 
protected classes the right to cast a meaningful vote.219  The statute was 
enacted to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment,220 which “opens the process to 
persons who had previously been excluded” and thus “seeks to enforce the 
representative’s duty of equal concern and respect.”221 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits the enactment of an 
electoral arrangement that results in the dilution of minority voting 
 
217. “There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a piece of paper and drop it in a 
box or the right to pull a lever in a voting booth.” S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 19 (1982) (Senate Report 
to 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 n.29 
(1964)), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 196; see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 
(1953) (finding a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment despite access of African Americans to the 
formal right to vote). 
218. The Act does not require a showing of intentional discrimination.  See Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (1988)) (amending Voting Rights Act to supplement Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 
(1980), which held that “action by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth 
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. 
White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978) (holding that a change in regulations that was not facially discriminatory 
but that affected the ability of candidates to run for office was subject to § 5 preclearance 
requirement). 
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (establishing the right of protected classes to enjoy the 
same opportunity to participate and to elect representatives of their choice as others); id. 
§ 1973(c)(1) (noting that the term “voting” includes “all action necessary to make a vote effective”); 
Kathryn Abrams, “Raising Politics Up”: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 454 (1988) (noting that diminution in the effectiveness 
of minority participation resulting in a § 2 violation can “be a result of electoral processes, such as 
polling or registration procedures, making elected positions appointive, or of districting 
arrangements”); Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial 
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 146 n.246 (1992) (noting that “section 2 
protects political participation beyond the formal right to vote” and therefore may invalidate 
electoral practices such as multimember districts). 
220. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (declaring that the “right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) 
(upholding the Voting Rights Act as a means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment); Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (holding that municipal boundaries that excluded African 
Americans could be challenged under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
221. See ELY, supra note 177, at 98 (“The Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding abridgment of the 
right to vote on account of race, opens the process to persons who had previously been excluded and 
thus by another strategy seeks to enforce the representative’s duty of equal concern and respect.”). 
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strength.222  A claimant establishes a violation of section 2 by showing, on 
the totality of the circumstances,223 that “the political processes leading to the 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally 
open to participation” by a racial minority group “in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”224 
While the electoral arrangements challenged under section 2 have 
generally been redistricting plans, a campaign finance system based on the 
existing distribution of wealth could arguably constitute a “political process” 
that is not “equally open to participation” by minorities.  Because they 
control fewer resources, people of color generally have less opportunity than 
others to participate in politics and elect representatives of their choice.  A 
political process based on private money gives wealthier white communities 
disproportionately large influence in determining all candidates, and, like the 
lines drawn for some electoral districts, it effectively excludes poorer minor-
ities from meaningful participation in the selection of their representatives.225  
Indeed, courts have cited racial disparities in the campaign finance context in 
support of their findings that certain legislative districts violated section 2.226 
 
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994). 
223. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (“[T]he trial court is to consider the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ and to determine, based ‘upon a searching practical evaluation of the 
“past and present reality,”‘ whether the political process is equally open to minority voters.”). 
224. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994). 
225. In their lone mention of the impact of the campaign finance system on racial minorities, 
Raskin and Bonifaz acknowledge in a footnote that the financial disadvantages faced by minority 
candidates in statewide races or in majority white districts are inconsistent with § 2, but they then 
assert that this financial disadvantage is mitigated in majority African American and Latino 
districts.  See Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 279 n.26.  The scholars admit 
that their research is “[p]reliminary” and that “[t]he question of a Voting Rights Act violation . . . is 
beyond the scope of this Article.”  See id.  As articulated in section III(B)(3), political money from 
predominantly white communities can significantly impair the electoral choice of people of color in 
both “majority minority” and predominantly white electoral districts. 
226. In determining whether a districting plan (rather than a plan for financing campaigns) 
violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, courts consider a variety of factors, including but not limited 
to the effects of discrimination which hinder the ability of protected classes to participate effectively 
in the political process.  See S. REP. NO. 94-417, at 28–29 (1982) (describing the fifth Senate Factor 
as “the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the 
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their 
ability to participate effectively in the political process”), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.  
In determining that reapportionment plans dilute minority voting rights in violation of § 2, a number 
of courts have cited economic disparities hindering minority political participation in the campaign 
finance context.  See, e.g., Rural W. Tenn. African Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v. Sundquist, 29 F. 
Supp. 2d 448, 459 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (“The economic and educational isolation of African-
Americans . . . limits their ability to fund and mount political campaigns. In this sense therefore, 
blacks are not able to equally participate in the political process.”); Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 
969 F. Supp. 749, 768 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“The economic disparity between the races in LaGrange 
translates into a disparity in the ability to impact the local political process.  For example, in the 
1995 elections for City Council, none of the African-American candidates received more total 
monetary contributions than any of the white candidates.  The African-American candidates 
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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may restrict some changes to a state 
or local system for financing politics, such as increased contribution limits.  
Under section 5 of the Act, a covered state may not implement a change in its 
election laws unless it demonstrates that the change will be free of racially 
discriminatory effects.227  Increased contribution limits have a retrogressive 
impact on minorities’ effective exercise of the franchise because increased 
limits enhance the electoral advantage of candidates favored by whites and 
add to the comparative disadvantages faced by minority voters’ preferred 
candidates.228  If a jurisdiction covered by section 5 were to propose 
increases to contribution limits, compliance with section 5 might require that 
the jurisdiction obtain preclearance from federal officials because the 
increased limits constitute “changes to election laws.”229 
While many current state and local systems for funding politics might 
be said to violate sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, an application of 
the Voting Rights Act does not comprehensively resolve the racial harms that 
private money causes.  The Voting Rights Act could be used, at most, to 
challenge state political money laws, as it is unlikely that the Act would be 
construed to invalidate federal financing provisions.  Further, looking to the 
federal limits as a model, it is unlikely that a court would find a violation 
when state contribution limits either match or are below the federal limits.  
Also, only particular geographic areas are required to submit their changes in 
 
received an average of $825.12 in contributions, and the white candidates received an average of 
$2,825.90 per candidate.”); McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 595 (E.D. Va. 1988) (“The 
median income for black families in the county is $19,824 versus $23,202 for white families.  In 
Henrico County, 11.2% of the black population and 5.2% of the white population lives below the 
poverty line. . . .  The Court finds that these differences adversely affect the ability of black citizens 
to participate in and influence the political process in Henrico County.  For example, while black 
candidate Thornton received slightly over $20,000 in contributions to his 1987 supervisory 
campaign, his white opponent, Waldrop, received slightly over $40,000.”). 
227. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973) (observing that § 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act “essentially freezes the election laws of the covered States unless a declaratory judgment 
is obtained in the District Court for the District of Columbia holding that a proposed change is 
without discriminatory purpose or effect”). 
228. The National Voting Rights Institute, founded by John Bonifaz, submitted a letter to the 
Justice Department making this argument in response to increased contribution limits in Georgia.  
See Letter from Brenda Wright, Managing Attorney, National Voting Rights Institute, to Joseph 
Rich, Chief of the Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice (Aug. 4, 2000) (on 
file with the Texas Law Review) (“Georgia’s effort to double the amounts that contributors may 
give . . . is clearly retrogressive with respect to minorities’ effective exercise of the franchise . . . .”).  
The Justice Department initiated its investigation by sending correspondence to Georgia inquiring 
as to what types of studies had been undertaken to determine the impact of the increased 
contribution limits on communities of color. 
229. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (requiring that particular states submit proposed changes to 
election laws to the Justice Department or a special three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia for preclearance in anticipation of revisions that effectively dilute the 
voting strength of racial minorities). 
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election practices for preclearance under section 5,230 and thus most areas 
would be able to raise their contribution limits and dilute the influence of 
people of color without concern for judicial or Justice Department approval.  
Finally, due to Buckley’s invalidation of spending limitations, the Voting 
Rights Act does little to address problems arising from the lack of spending 
limits.  The wealthy, who are overwhelmingly white, could continue to spend 
as much as they wanted on their own campaigns or the campaigns of others. 
Despite the failure of the Voting Rights Act to resolve all problems 
regarding race and campaign finance, the Voting Rights Act and judicial 
interpretations of the statute are important in principle.  The doctrine estab-
lishes that courts and legislatures have concerned themselves with identifying 
and eliminating electoral practices that not only intentionally231 but also 
effectively minimize the opportunity of people of color to participate in the 
political process. 
B. Racial Consideration 
A separate, more general approach to campaign finance would 
encourage decisionmakers to consider whether a facially race-neutral legal 
pronouncement tends to reaffirm or exacerbate the effects of past laws and 
practices that discriminated against people of color.232  Courts and leg-
islatures regularly employ policy considerations as analytical tools in 
determining how to create and apply law.  Such policy considerations include 
fairness arguments related to individual and group rights, justice in social 
relationships, social utility, economic efficiency, and concern for the general 
welfare.233  Contextual approaches such as law and economics have offered 
 
230. See id. (exploring preclearance requirements and applying them to the political 
subdivisions described in § 1973b(b)). 
231. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134, 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 
U.S. 32, 43 (1978). 
232. Professor Martha Minow suggests that one strategy to address the wounds that propel 
identity politics includes a commitment to reversing the effects of categorical exclusions without 
deploying group-based categories in governmental decisionmaking.  See Minow, supra note 8, at 
675 (proposing to “address the systemic harms that animate and perpetuate identity politics” in part 
through “sustained public acknowledgment of past and continuing oppressions on group-bases and 
support for individual self-fulfillment without the truncated effects of assigned group identities”).  
Professor Minow cites one example as “[a]rchitectural designs for buildings that accommodate 
people who use wheelchairs without segregating them in separate entrances and elevators . . . .”  Id. 
at 687. 
233. See SINGER, supra note 10, at 279–82 (describing the use of policy as an analytical tool in 
lawmaking).  The consideration of race is related to existing policy considerations and cuts across 
both fairness and social-utility considerations.  Most obviously, it requires a consideration of justice 
to communities of color and a respect for the rights of individuals within these communities.  A 
consideration of race also inquires into the social consequences of a particular decision and ensures 
that all Americans are included in our concern for the general welfare.  The consideration of race is 
not unique in its relation to existing values considered by courts, since other policy considerations, 
such as social utility and general welfare, overlap with one another.  Despite the overlap, the 
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penetrating insights into the workings of campaign finance,234 and a racial 
analysis is no less promising. 
In considering race, one need not employ a constitutional 
pronouncement that mechanically locks decisionmakers into reaching one 
conclusion and excludes the consideration of other factors.235  Considering 
race does not restrict legislators to enacting only those campaign finance 
laws most beneficial to people of color, and it does not prevent judges from 
finding against litigants who are people of color.  Racial consideration is not 
the rhetorically infamous “race card” that trumps all other considerations.236  
Instead, race is one policy consideration that should sometimes be employed 
by legal decisionmakers in conjunction with other factors.237 
One might assert that an independent consideration of race is irrelevant 
in designing legislative reforms, as any reform that assists the poor will 
benefit people of color.  The thought is that while the injustice of racial 
 
historical and contemporary importance of race in shaping the distribution of wealth, as well as the 
racial composition of the population, warrants that we formally consider race on its own grounds.  
Deconstructing and hiding race behind several other policy considerations obscures its significance.  
The whole of racial consideration is more than the sum of its parts.  Familiarity with other 
overlapping policy arguments should only breed confidence in the value of the consideration of race 
as a credible analytical tool. 
234. See Elizabeth Garrett, Law and Economics, 31 N.M. L. REV. 107, 117 (2001) (suggesting 
“three ways in which law and economics can help campaign finance reform efforts and our analysis 
of those efforts”); Hasen, supra note 39, at 7 (proposing a campaign finance plan that  “reforms the 
political market with proper incentives and safeguards that channel self-regarding political behavior 
to produce fair and efficient political outcomes,” but replaces “normative public choice theory’s 
efficiency criterion with the normative goal of promoting an egalitarian pluralist political market”); 
Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 524 (2000) (arguing that most campaign finance regulations fail because they overemphasize 
restricting the supply of private money, and that future reforms should focus on decreasing 
politicians’ demand for private money).  “Law and economics” is contextual in that law is examined 
in the context of economic markets, incentives, and efficiencies, and a consideration of race is 
contextual in that law is examined in the context of racial history and current racial relations.  Cf. 
Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An Intriguing 
Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 102–03 (1998) (“Pursuant to [contextualism], law is examined in 
light of the problems, policies, or ideological assumptions which accompany its genesis and 
application. . . . [S]eemingly objective rules cannot be applied blindly without regard for the 
contextual realities that shape an event and influence the actors and the decision makers.”). 
235. A consideration of race in making decisions does not revise judicial tests developed to 
establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not an 
attempt to replace the Equal Protection Clause’s discriminatory-intent requirement with a 
discriminatory-impact requirement.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) 
(holding that in order to establish a claim that a facially neutral law violates equal protection, 
plaintiffs must prove a racially discriminatory intent or purpose on the part of those responsible for 
the law’s enactment or administration). 
236. A racial analysis is just like any other policy consideration in that it lacks utility and is 
“unpersuasive in its extreme form.”  See SINGER, supra note 10, at 279 (observing that “[e]ach of 
the [policy] arguments is unpersuasive in its extreme form”). 
237. The consideration of race, not unlike policy analysis generally, is not a science and would 
be applied in ways that are beyond precise measurement.  The application of policy analysis is 
context-specific.  Different individual decisionmakers use different policy considerations when 
confronted by different facts. 
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discrimination may provide an additional reason for courts to tolerate or 
legislatures to enact campaign finance reform, people of color are dis-
advantaged due to their economic status, not their racial status.  Any reform 
that benefits the poor will thus equally benefit minorities, the argument goes, 
and a separate racial analysis of a reform adds nothing. 
Civil-rights groups, elected officials, activists, and academic 
commentators have recently used race in analyzing proposed reforms, 
however, and their examinations have exposed concerns that class-based 
reformers have overlooked.  For example, the law permits corporations, 
unions, and individuals to give unlimited soft money contributions to polit-
ical parties, but restricts the parties’ use of soft money to “party building” 
projects, like voter mobilization.238  The recently enacted Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act prohibits soft money gifts after November 6, 2002.239  
Conventional Reformers assume that the ban on soft money will help less 
wealthy economic classes, including but not limited to racial minorities, who 
are generally deprived of the special access enjoyed by those who give soft 
money.240  The analysis of conventional Reformers, however, is incomplete, 
because it does not consider the extent to which political parties use soft 
money to support both voter mobilization in communities of color and 
minority candidates.  A person considering race might assert that banning 
soft money contributions will harm communities of color because doing so 
will eliminate over $40 million that political parties use to encourage voter 
turnout,241 including voter turnout by Democrats in predominantly African 
 
238. See CORRADO, supra note 20, at 68.  The Federal Election Commission initially allowed 
parties to raise soft money in unlimited amounts and use the funds for party-building activities such 
as voter registration and voter mobilization, but these uses expanded in the 1980s to include party 
overhead, infrastructure improvements, and other indirect support for candidates, and more recently 
to include electioneering communications that directly support or attack clearly identified federal 
candidates.  Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 620, 629–31 (2000). 
239. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 Stat. 81 
(2002). 
240. See, e.g., Letter from Scott Harshbarger, President & CEO of Common Cause, to all 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus (July 11, 2001), available at http://commoncause.org 
(“[T]he current soft money system is a loser for the constituency you represent.  I say this without 
making great assumptions about your constituents, but simply by knowing that the current soft 
money system is bad for almost every American, save those few who have the financial resources to 
become major players in the pay-to-play system.”). 
241. In discussions of campaign finance reform, some members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus articulated concerns that a ban on soft money will impair voter mobilization in African 
American communities.  See Juliet Eilperin, House Tackles Campaign Reform; Representatives 
Remain Divided on McCain-Feingold Bill, WASH. POST, May 2, 2001, at A6, 2001 WL 17625060 
(mentioning that “a number of Democrats . . . including members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus, have expressed concern that the Senate bill would undermine the parties’ ability to 
mobilize voters”); Alison Mitchell & Adam Clymer, Democrats Maneuver on Soft Money as Vote 
Nears, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at A12, LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File (reporting that 
Congressional Black Caucus member Albert Wynn is convinced “that soft money [is] needed for 
spending on voter education and getting out the minority vote”); Conti, supra note 6, at 132 
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American communities.242  Further, the argument goes, national parties use 
soft money to pay for issue advertisements that support viable minority 
candidates who have difficulty raising money, and the ban on soft money 
might jeopardize the political prospects of these candidates.243 
Similarly, by focusing on class the Reformers also overlook important 
racial variables arising from reform proposals that would prohibit a candidate 
from accepting contributions from residents outside of her electoral 
district.244  The thought behind such a proposal is that poorer residents of a 
particular electoral district should not be forced to compete for the attention 
of their representatives with more wealthy out-of-district contributors.  A 
consideration of race, however, reveals that such restrictions might 
disadvantage some candidates of color running in districts comprised of 
predominantly white populations—like U.S. Senate candidates Carol 
Moseley Braun and Harvey Gantt—who rely on out-of-district contributions. 
Even if one accepts that a consideration of race adds an analytical 
element that a consideration of class overlooks, one might be troubled by the 
fact that a consideration of race does not provide a definitive conclusion as to 
the merits of a particular reform.  Those who consider race are far from 
unanimous in their opinions regarding particular reforms, as persuasive 
arguments can be made as to why many reforms that help the poor also help 
people of color. 
For example, some who consider race support the soft money ban, and 
assert that any benefits that people of color gain from soft money are 
 
(asserting that challenger candidates would have had to raise an additional $40 million for voter 
turnout had soft money been banned in the 2000 election cycle).  In response to these concerns, the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act allows state and local parties to accept up to $10,000 each year 
per individual for get-out-the-vote and voter-registration efforts in federal elections.  See Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (“[N]o person 
(including any person established, financed, maintained, or controlled by such person) may donate 
more than $10,000 to a State, district, or local committee of a political party in a calendar 
year . . . .”).  In the interests of full disclosure, the author of this Article advised several members of 
the Congressional Black Caucus on the merits and shortcomings of various campaign finance-
reform proposals. 
242. Along similar lines, Professor Samuel Issacharoff has asserted that certain provisions of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act could be interpreted to restrict the ability of the NAACP 
National Voter Fund and churches to mobilize voters in minority neighborhoods.  See Issacharoff, 
supra note 6, at 1530 (“The unexplored implications of [the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act] 
could reach as far as the activities of non-partisan institutions . . . that assist in voter mobilization 
campaigns in cooperation with political parties. . . .  [The Act’s] further reaches could include many 
of the functions that have become a hallmark of black political mobilization.”). 
243. See Conti, supra note 6, at 133 (asserting that “when viable minority and female 
candidates need money, the party steps forward to provide support” with soft money). 
244. Cf. Raskin & Bonifaz, Equal Protection, supra note 37, at 295 (“PACs located in 
Washington or New York occupy a far more significant role in the wealth primary than do poor or 
moderate-income voters in the official’s home state or district. . . .  Similarly, large contributions by 
wealthy interests from out-of-state are certainly more important than contributions from poor and 
median-income voters who live in the state or district.”). 
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minimal and outweighed by political disadvantages.  Most voter mobilization 
activities in communities of color are overwhelmingly financed not by soft 
money, but by party “hard money”245 and through the efforts of labor unions 
and nonpartisan groups like the NAACP National Voter Fund,246 the National 
Coalition on Black Voter Participation, and the A. Philip Randolph 
Institute.247  Further, the vast majority of soft money is spent not on voter 
mobilization activities,248 but on issue advertisements targeted at swing 
voters, who are almost always white.  There is “scant evidence that soft 
money is used to promote minority issues” among these swing voters.249  
Therefore, the argument goes, the negligible benefits of soft money are 
outweighed by political marginalization, because very few minorities benefit 
from the access that large soft money contributors enjoy.250 
The split in opinion among those who employ the lens of race is not 
limited to soft money reforms.  One might assert that reforms that would 
prohibit a candidate from accepting contributions from those who reside 
 
245. Anthony Corrado provides a definition of “hard money”: “Hard money is the money raised 
under federal contribution limits for use in federal elections. . . .  Hard money can be used for any 
purpose and is the only funding that can be used to finance activities that directly benefit and 
advocate the election or defeat of federal candidates . . . .”  CORRADO, supra note 20, at 67–68. 
246. Michael A. Fletcher, In Targeted States, A Striking Turnout Of Black Voters, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 17, 2000, at A29 (attributing the high turnout of African American voters in the 2000 
presidential election in part to the fact that “the NAACP National Voter Fund . . . spent $10 million 
to register and turn out black voters”). 
247. In advising the Congressional Black Caucus on this issue, The Fannie Lou Hamer Project 
has argued that the ban on soft money is beneficial to communities of color, in large part because 
the benefits of soft money to people of color are overstated.  See Memorandum from The Fannie 
Lou Hamer Project, to the Congressional Black Caucus Members 4 (May 15, 2001) (on file with the 
Texas Law Review), available at http://home.att.net/~sodafam/fannielou/cbcmemo.htm. 
248. See The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, The Purposes and 
Beneficiaries of Party “Soft Money” (last modified July 3, 2001), available at http:// 
www.brennancenter.org/resources/downloads/purposes_beneficiaries070301.pdf (finding that just 
8.3% of soft money spent by the Republican and Democratic parties went to voter education, phone 
banks, voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, and other traditional party-building activities); 
Donna Brazile, Soft Money’s Scanty Leftovers, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2001, at A17, LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, NYT File (arguing that soft money does not “really help the democratic process in minority 
communities,” because most soft money “is spent on television ads or on media consultants” and 
only “scanty leftovers remain for increasing voter turnout and participation among minorities and in 
poor communities”). 
249. Smith, supra note 6, at 1515 (“Quite apart from the development and election of black 
candidates, there is likewise scant evidence that soft money is used to promote minority issues, thus 
creating a greater substantive basis for minority voter participation in the electoral process.”). 
250. John Conyers, The Truth About the CBC and a Soft Money Ban, ROLL CALL, July 12, 
2001, at 14 (“[I]n practice, soft money puts [African American] issues at the back of the bus. . . .  
Gun violence is the No. 1 cause of death for 15- to 34-year-old black males, but the soft money of 
the gun lobby blocks legislation to keep guns out of criminals’ hands.”); Memorandum from The 
Fannie Lou Hamer Project, to the Congressional Black Caucus Members 5 (May 15, 2001) (on file 
with the Texas Law Review) (asserting that “soft money contributors and fundraisers enjoy 
disproportionate authority in the Democratic Party” and that a “ban on soft money would allow for a 
more inclusive Democratic Party that would better represent the interests of people of color”), 
available at http://home.att.net/~sodafam/fannielou/cbcmemo.htm. 
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outside of her electoral district disproportionately benefit people of color.  
Minority-elected officials who represent predominantly minority populations 
often receive a large percentage of out-of-district contributions.  A ban on 
such contributions, the argument might go, enhances the accountability of 
minority representatives to their constituents.  Individuals considering race 
may also arrive at different conclusions with regard to other reforms, such as 
increases or reductions in the amounts individuals251 or political action 
committees252 can contribute to candidates. 
 
251. For example, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (also known as “McCain-Feingold”) 
doubles the amount of money an individual can contribute to a federal candidate from $1000 to 
$2000.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  
Some assert that people of color make fewer large contributions of hard money than do whites, and 
that under a regulatory scheme contemplated by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, people of 
color would have even less influence over the political process.  Additionally, minority candidates 
would be disadvantaged with increased contribution limits because they have more difficulty than 
white candidates in raising large contributions.  See Smith, supra note 6, at 1513 (asserting that 
“McCain-Feingold exacerbates hard money funding inequities between black and white 
candidates”); Conti, supra note 6, at 138 (“While raising contribution limits is typically just one 
element in a package of reforms, it does not appear as though it would have any benefit to female or 
black candidates and would most likely prove problematic.”); Spencer Overton, Reform for the Rest 
of America, WASH. POST, May 10, 2001, at A31, 2001 WL 17627323 (asserting that some members 
of the Congressional Black Caucus “raise legitimate concerns about” McCain-Feingold, and the bill 
“dismisses . . . values of inclusion and participation by raising hard money contribution limits from 
$1,000 to $2,000”); see also Robert Moore, Short Changed: Race and Campaign Finance Reform 
(Aug. 24, 2000), at http://www.innercitynews.com/special_report_from_the_nnpa_inv.htm (finding 
that as of June 2000, more than $1.2 billion had been raised for the 2000 federal elections, less than 
1% of which had been received by African American incumbents and challengers); JOEL A. 
THOMPSON & GARY F. MONCRIEF, CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 154 
(1997) (observing that “minority candidates, for the most part, raise and spend less than non-
Hispanic white candidates,” and asserting that this factor may be particularly problematic in light of 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that limit the use of race as a criteria for drawing electoral 
districts”).  In response, those in favor of increased contribution limits have argued that most 
minority candidates run against other minority candidates, and are thus not disadvantaged by an 
increase in contribution limits that allows two white candidates, who are running in a neighboring 
district, to raise and spend twice as much.  Lowenstein, supra note 6, at 1537–38 (“Two black 
candidates opposing each other in one district would not be disadvantaged because two white 
candidates in a neighboring district spent twice as much.”); A Stall in the House, WASH. POST, May 
10, 2001, at A30 (“A candidate from a low-income district will by definition face a rival from the 
same district.  If the pool of available funds turns out in fact to be low, it will be low for both.”).  To 
the extent minority incumbents face fewer electoral challenges because they are able to raise even 
more than minority challengers under the increased limits, the argument goes, their minority 
constituents benefit, because seniority has importance in most legislatures.  See Lowenstein, supra 
note 6, at 1538. 
252. Recognizing that minority candidates receive a larger percentage of their contributions 
from PACs, one could argue that a ban or lowered limit on PAC contributions might adversely 
impact people of color.  See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1409–10 (“Sometimes minority candidates 
can succeed only with the help of PACs specifically organized for their particular benefit.  For this 
reason, PAC limits will in some circumstances diminish the power of minority candidates.”); Conti, 
supra note 6, at 123–24 (“In short, PACs play a prominent role in the financial security of minority 
candidates, particularly black candidates, and any restriction on this funding source would 
disproportionately affect this already underrepresented group.”); John Lewis, In Defense of PACs, 
WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at A25 (asserting that African American Congressman John Lewis “was 
able to mount a credible and ultimately successful bid for Congress only because of the support 
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These divergent opinions on race and campaign finance reform should 
not be troubling, as the conflicts reveal the political nature of campaign 
finance.  The diversity of perspectives among those looking to further the 
interests of people of color is no less legitimate than the varied democratic 
priorities and values adopted by those who support reform legislation without 
considering race.253  The text of the First Amendment does not embrace a 
particular political theory as to the mobilization of voters of color, the 
political strength of people of color in relation to that of large contributors, or 
the election of particular types of candidates of color in predominantly 
majority districts and predominantly minority districts.254  The disagreements 
about the effect of campaign finance reform on people of color are based on 
different assumptions and philosophies about democracy, many of which are 
reasonable but also inherently political.255 
 
given . . . by labor union political action committees and a few other PACs”); David J. Weidman, 
Comment, The Real Truth About Federal Campaign Finance: Rejecting the Hysterical Call for 
Publicly Financed Congressional Campaigns, 63 TENN. L. REV. 775, 783 (1996) (noting that the 
Black Congressional Caucus “has vehemently opposed any proposals to eliminate PACs”); Tim 
Curran, Campaign Finance Reform Bill Besieged By Four Separate Democratic Factions, ROLL 
CALL, May 17, 1993 (noting that PACs make major contributions to “many African American 
House Members, who often lack large contributor bases in their own districts”).  On the other hand, 
recognizing that white candidates receive more money from PACs than candidates of color receive, 
and assuming that very few PACs are financed by or controlled by people of color, large PAC 
contributions could be said to provide white candidates an advantage over minority candidates and 
to dilute the influence of voters of color.  See THEILMANN & WILHITE, supra note 167, at 98–99 
(“[B]lack incumbents received $7,400 less from labor PACs in 1980, $16,000 less from corporate 
PACs in 1998, and $2,800 to $4,900 less from cooperatives’ PACs (1982 and 1984). . . .  In 1980, 
trade PACs gave $8,300 less to black candidates, and by 1988 this disparity had almost doubled.”). 
253. Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 304 (“The problem is that even among those who join in 
the desire to expunge corrupt campaign finance practices, there is not, and never will be, a 
consensus on how to evaluate the numerous additional foreseeable effects the reforms will have on 
politics.”).  Some have observed that Reformers’ support of different reform proposals that advance 
varied values is the primary obstacle to the passage of reform.  See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 12, at 
375–76 (observing that the various goals of campaign finance reform often conflict, and the “fact 
that the types of harms to the political process are so varied means that there is little likelihood that 
a solution could be crafted that addresses all these concerns”).  In light of this observation, one 
could argue that the consideration of an additional factor such as race diminishes the prospects for 
the successful adoption of a reform proposal.  The consideration of race, however, is no less 
important than, and is a crucial component of, the consideration of other concerns.  Reformers 
cannot overlook context-specific factors like race and expect to successfully implement broad 
objectives related to equality, inclusion, and representative government. 
254. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the 
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.  It is made for people of fundamentally 
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and 
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question of whether statutes embodying 
them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.”). 
255. Cf. Edward B. Foley, Philosophy, the Constitution, and Campaign Finance, 10 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 23, 30 (1998) (“Furthermore, we now also understand that, because the words of the 
First Amendment do not preclude egalitarian campaign finance, Congress should be permitted to 
adopt this position. Otherwise, the elected representatives of the American people would be denied 
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For example, commentators who consider race emphasize an assortment 
of democratic values and goals, such as increasing the competitiveness of 
elections for candidates of color,256 enhancing minority voter turnout,257 and 
enhancing the political influence of people of color relative to contributors.258  
Some focus on how citizens, candidates, and parties use political money 
(either to assist or disadvantage minority voters or candidates).259  Some 
concentrate on the source of political money, and note that the political 
interests of people of color are marginalized due to the attention afforded the 
political objectives of those who are able to spend and contribute large 
amounts.  Others could assert that enhanced regulation might increase the 
possibility of selective enforcement of laws against minority contributors and 
candidates,260 or suppress the grassroots political activity of minorities who 
lack access to expensive professional services to interpret and comply with 
regulations.261 
 
the right to adopt a philosophically plausible position on campaign finance just because the 
judiciary held a different philosophical perspective.”). 
256. See Conti, supra note 6, at 100 (“However, the main goal of any real campaign finance 
reform must be to increase the competitiveness of congressional elections by attempting to level the 
playing field between incumbents and challengers.”); Smith, supra note 6, at 1509 (“More 
specifically, McCain-Feingold, as recently passed by the United States Senate, does not assist in 
creating a level playing field for candidates of color.”). 
257. See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 1525 (focusing on how black voter turnout may be 
hampered due to selected campaign finance reform provisions). 
258. See Smith, supra note 6, at 1491 (observing that “money harms voters of color by creating 
for them, in the words of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, ‘less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’”). 
259. Compare Conti, supra note 6, at 132 (asserting that soft money is used for minority voter 
turnout), with Smith, supra note 6, at 1515–16 (“The soft money ads that the Democratic Party ran 
on behalf of Al Gore largely tracked the issues of the Gore campaign itself . . . [which pursued] . . . 
white swing voters to the exclusion of black concerns. . . .  Soft money without a racially 
transformative ideology . . . renders [black voters] mere supplicants in the political process rather 
than equals to glorified white independents.”). 
260. See Chen, supra note 74, at 354 (recognizing that “the entire first month of the Senate’s 
hearings on the campaign finance controversy focused exclusively on activities of Asian Pacific 
Americans and 49 of the first 53 subpoenas were directed against Asian Pacific Americans”); Mark 
Curriden, Selective Prosecution: Are Black Officials Investigative Targets?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 
55 (“[M]ore than 14 percent of the public corruption cases over the past five years targeted black 
officials, who make up less than two percent of the country’s elected officials. . . .  Since 1980, 21 
black elected officials have been prosecuted in Alabama alone [and] . . . 16 were found not guilty, 
two pleaded guilty, and three were convicted. . . .  Though less than one-half of one percent of the 
federal judiciary is black, three of the five U.S. District Court judges indicted in the past decade 
were black.”); Ernie Freda, Washington in Brief, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 13, 1995, at B7, 1995 
WL 6535801 (describing the Federal Election Commission’s $150,000 civil fine against the 1988 
Jesse Jackson presidential committee as the highest fine of an individual campaign in history); Chen 
& Minami, supra note 74, at 364 (discussing the focus of Senate hearings on Asian-Pacific 
Americans to the exclusion of foreign nationals from non-Asian states who made more significant 
contributions); Wang, supra note 74, at 330 (“Instead of addressing the systematic problem of 
money corruption in politics, politicians discovered a fetching distraction: blame the problem on 
‘Asians’ and the unscrupulous ‘agents’ of communist China.”). 
261. Cf. Smith, supra note 6, at 1083 (arguing that campaign finance regulation typically favors 
“those with the money and sophistication to hire the lawyers, accountants, and lobbyists needed to 
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A sophisticated policy analysis of the racial impact of a particular 
reform involves an initial understanding of how the reform implicates these 
different individual values.  It also requires a balancing of the ways in which 
the reform advances various values against how the reform hinders those 
values.  For example, the statement that “soft money is bad for people of 
color because it dilutes the influence of people of color” is, by itself, 
incomplete.  Similarly, the statement that “soft money is good for people of 
color because it is used for voter mobilization in minority neighborhoods” is 
deficient.  To arrive at an informed judgment about soft money, one must 
consider both of these factors (along with others, such as the importance of 
issue advertisements supporting minority candidates financed by soft 
money), and balance them against one another.  Any balancing will involve 
an empirical assessment of each factor, such as inquiries into the extent to 
which soft money contributors are given access to political leaders and the 
percentage of soft money that is spent on voter mobilization.262  The 
balancing will also involve theoretical but personal value judgments, such as 
whether the minority voter mobilization financed by soft money is more 
important to one’s view of a properly functioning democracy than minority 
 
comply with complex filing requirements” and will “naturally disadvantage newcomers to the 
political arena, especially those who are themselves less educated or less able to pay for 
professional services”); 84 Jackson Unit Will Pay Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1987, at D30, 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NYT File (describing the $13,000 civil penalty against the 1984 Jesse 
Jackson presidential committee for mistakes which, according to campaign officials, “reflected the 
technical inexperience of local dedicated grass-roots volunteers”). 
262. The opinions about how a ban on soft money and other reforms will uniquely impact 
people of color may stem, in part, from empirical assumptions that particular ethnic groups are more 
cohesive in their political preferences than particular economic classes, and that a political party has 
incentives to raise and spend political money to mobilize members of ethnic groups that are inclined 
to favor the party.  Cf. MICHAEL DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (1994) (“[B]ecause the social, economic, and political realities of whites and 
blacks differ substantially because of race, racial interests continue to override class interests 
(whether individual or family). . . .  As long as this is true . . . one should expect high levels of 
political unity among African Americans regardless of economic status.”); ANDREA Y. SIMPSON, 
THE TIE THAT BINDS: IDENTITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS 
GENERATION 16 (1998) (“[R]egardless of socioeconomic status, age, or gender, blacks believe that 
their individual fate is tied to the fate of the group.”); DONALD KINDER & LYNN SANDERS, 
DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 31 (1996) (“Blacks and whites 
are socially diverse; they are subject to various crosscutting pressure—but this is not enough, 
evidently, to prevent race from emerging as a ‘single profound line of cleavage.’”); see also 
JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE 
NATION 68 (1995) (“Whites believe it [the American dream] works for everyone; blacks believe it 
works only for those not of their race.  Whites are angry that blacks refuse to see the fairness and 
openness of the system; blacks are angry that whites refuse to see the biases and blockages of the 
system.”); BILL HING, TO BE AN AMERICAN 173 (1997) (asserting that ethnic identity supports 
individual political development because many “people of color are isolated or have no sense of 
identity . . . at work, at school, or in social settings”). 
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participation in party politics undiluted by the influence of large soft money 
contributors.263 
A consideration of the racial impact of a campaign finance reform 
proposal is further complicated by context-specific factors.  Just as the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act increases the amount of money an 
individual can give to a federal candidate to $2000 from $1000 while also 
banning unlimited soft money contributions to political parties,264 campaign 
finance legislation often contains multiple provisions that impact people of 
color in different ways.  The effects of these multiple reform provisions must 
be balanced against one another.  Also, individuals of color have varied 
experiences.  An individual minority candidate or voter might look to how 
the reform proposal impacts her own individual political influence or the in-
fluence of her particular ethnic group, and give that impact great weight even 
though other minority candidates and voters may be impacted in different 
ways.265  Further, various decisionmakers will have different descriptive 
understandings of how politics actually works and different normative 
aspirations as to how politics should work.266  Although the responsiveness 
of candidates and parties to the concerns of minority constituents, the success 
of minority candidates, and the mobilization of minority voters are important 
factors, no universally accepted baseline or single neutral value exists to use 
in measuring the racial impact of a particular reform.  In analyzing proposed 
reforms, therefore, those considering race must make judgments as to which 
democratic values should have priority. 
The fact that a ban on soft money and other reforms are far from 
adequate to address the structural problems that exclude people of color from 
 
263. Cf. Strauss, supra note 39, at 1379–80 (“Part of the task of campaign finance reform is to 
try to determine what kind of representative government we want—which aspects of representative 
government we want to suppress, which we want to encourage, and at what cost.”).  Along similar 
lines, both the freedom to make out-of-district contributions and the proposal to ban out-of-district 
contributions may simultaneously benefit and disadvantage people of color.  The choice between 
the two options depends in part on empirical questions that weigh the number of predominantly 
minority districts against the number of minority candidates from districts with predominantly white 
populations.  A choice between the two options might also involve a political decision that 
compares the political importance of minority candidates who are accountable to minority 
constituents against the political importance of minority representatives elected from majority 
districts. 
264. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 Stat. 81 
(2002) (banning soft money); id. § 307 (doubling the amount of money an individual can contribute 
to a federal candidate from $1000 to $2000). 
265. Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 336 (“An issue like campaign finance reform can and 
should be considered on many levels, including the broadest public interest level but not excluding 
particularistic interests.  The answer to the question of how to talk about campaign finance reform is 
that it depends on whom you are talking to.”). 
266. Cf. id. at 340 (“However, outside the bounds of the minimal consensus, there is no reason 
to expect one person’s conception of the public good to correspond to another’s.  Plainly, differing 
conceptions of the public interest come into conflict in the debate on campaign finance.”). 
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the political process may also contribute to the lack of unanimity regarding 
campaign finance proposals among those who consider race.  A more 
inclusive vision of democracy might not be confined to choosing between 
eliminating the political influence of soft money contributors or continuing 
voter-mobilization efforts in communities of color.267  Many who have 
considered campaign finance proposals and race favor the public financing of 
elections, which could achieve both objectives.268 
Whereas questions related to administrability and political feasibility 
haunt the payment of reparations to people of color, public financing may be 
a race-neutral solution that mitigates historical disparities in resources with 
regard to politics.  Indeed, public financing illustrates that a consideration of 
race can serve as a diagnostic tool that exposes broad structural faults in 
democracy and arrives at solutions that benefit Americans of all ethnic 
 
267. Rather than simply accepting that an individual citizen has a responsibility to secure or 
meet the conditions necessary for her political participation, an inclusive vision proposes that courts 
and democratic decisionmakers have a responsibility to create an environment that allows for, and 
even encourages, participation by all citizens.  See Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table, Bush v. 
Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 469 (2001). 
268. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 60 (drawing the conclusion that “[w]omen, African Americans, Latinos and other 
disproportionately poor groups near the bottom of the social structure have less political power in an 
electoral system in which voice and power can be purchased than they would in a system with 
public financing of campaigns, stringent spending limits, and free media time”); Conti, supra note 
6, at 156 (“To enact real reform, to truly give minorities and women the chance to reach parity in 
the United States Congress, full public financing needs to be enacted.”); Smith, supra note 6, at 
1522 (“There is arguably no short-term solution to [racial disparities in economic resources] other 
than a system of public financing or public subsidies to poorer candidates.  Inclusionary reform will 
perhaps have to embrace such a scheme, whatever its imperfections.”); NAACP Endorses Public 
Financing of Elections, Press Release, The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, July 11, 2001, at 
http://home.att.net/~sodafam/fannielou/naacpend.htm (reporting that in July 2001, the NAACP 
adopted a resolution calling for full public financing of elections); The Freedom Agenda of The 
Black Radical Congress, Art. II (1999), at http://blackradicalcongress.com/brc_fagenda.html (“We 
oppose private financing of electoral campaigns, especially corporate contributions; we will work to 
replace the present corrupt system with public financing.”); H.R. 1637, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(indicating that the co-sponsors of the public-financing bill included Congressional Hispanic 
Caucus member Ciro D. Rodriguez and Congressional Black Caucus members William Lacy Clay, 
John Conyers, Danny Davis, Chaka Fattah, Harold Ford, Jr., Jesse L. Jackson, Barbara Lee, John 
Lewis, and Cynthia McKinney).  Congressional Black Caucus member Harold Ford endorses public 
financing, although he does not explicitly consider race in his article on campaign finance reform.  
See Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizon for Campaign Finance Reform, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 317 (2001) (“The most comprehensive campaign finance reform efforts on 
the federal level ought to include the public financing of congressional elections.”).  Recognizing 
the political nature of campaign finance, a few individuals use race to illustrate their objections to 
public financing.  See David A. Mittell, Jr., Bay State’s ‘Clean Elections’ Brouhaha, PROVIDENCE 
JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Apr. 30, 2000, at 10E (“With public financing, sooner or later the government 
will be funding the Ku Klux Klan or its like.”); Richard C. Paddock, Prop. 68 Foes Use Klan to 
Push Message, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at A27 (“Opponents of [a partial public funding ballot 
initiative] began a last-minute television campaign Friday with a commercial featuring white-robed 
‘members’ of the Ku Klux Klan who, an announcer in the ad says, could receive tax dollars under 
the campaign finance initiative.”). 
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backgrounds.269   The plight of those most vulnerable in society, such as 
people of color who have been adversely impacted by past discriminatory 
policies, illustrates problems that affect citizens generally when democratic 
institutions adopt the values and the flaws of private economic markets.270  
While public financing of campaigns might benefit people of color 
disproportionately, the reform also benefits Americans generally, as 93% of 
the population does not make reportable contributions under the current 
privately financed system.271  By improving “the situation of the less 
favored” through public financing, decisionmakers “improve that of citizens 
generally.”272 
A democratic vision tailored toward mitigating racial disparities in 
wealth among citizens might prefer public-financing proposals that allow 
individual citizens to allocate a fixed amount of public funds to their 
preferred candidates and severely limit or prohibit the use of private 
contributions and expenditures to fund election-related speech.273  While 
 
269. Some commentators have suggested that there is social utility in heeding and curing the 
social ills that impact people of color, as these conditions often reflect structural inequities that 
adversely affect other Americans in less visible ways.  See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE 
MINER’S CANARY (forthcoming 2002) (“Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s 
canary. It is easy enough to think that when we sacrifice this canary the only harm is to 
communities of color.  Yet if those who are racially marginalized do function as the miner’s canary, 
others ignore problems that converge around racial minorities at their own peril.  We are ignoring 
the symptoms that tell us we are all being poisoned.”); Minow, supra note 8, at 678 (asserting that 
“legislatures, police departments, prosecutors, governors, and mayors should examine massive 
group disparities in their purview as clues to underlying problems deserving remedy”). 
270. Others have written about considering the perspectives of those most vulnerable when 
designing institutional structures.  Cf. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER, 
at xvi (2d ed. 2000) (asserting that a view from the “margin” allows one to understand both the 
center and the margin of society, and provides a sense of wholeness); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two 
Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
928, 950–51 (2001) (“Critics of liberal theory, including critical race theorists, have offered another 
way to think about promoting equality and human dignity, one that reflects the perspective of the 
subordinated.”); Spencer Overton, Fannie Lou Hamer Wouldn’t Like This, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
2001, at B11 (discussing the Fannie Lou Hamer standard, which considers the campaign finance 
system from the perspective of a poor woman of color like Fannie Lou Hamer). 
271. Raskin & Bonifaz, Constitutional Imperative, supra note 37, at 1177 (“Less than one 
percent of the nation’s population contributed seventy-seven percent of all campaign funds raised in 
the 1992 election cycle in individual contributions of $200 or more.”); Rosenkranz, supra note 182, 
at 888 (noting that only 4% to 6% of Americans make any campaign contributions at all). 
272. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 71 (rev. ed. 1999) (observing that it “seems probable 
that if the authority and powers of legislators and judges, say, improve the situation of the less 
favored, they improve that of citizens generally”); Guinier, supra note 8, at 137 (“Thus, the legal 
claims of racial minorities are not resolved to benefit racial minorities alone but to make politics 
better for everyone.”).  Further, the use of racial history in support of public-financing reforms that 
will benefit most Americans may be a useful step toward persuading most Americans to recognize 
racial history in support of remedial proposals targeted to help people of color specifically. 
273. See Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 
AM. PROSPECT 71, 78–79 (1993); Foley, supra note 36, at 1204 (“The Constitution of the United 
States should contain a principle, which I shall call ‘equal-dollars-per-voter,’ that would guarantee 
to each eligible voter equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing any candidate 
 
2002] But Some Are More Equal 1051 
 
public-financing plans that give money directly to campaigns allow the 
candidates to shape the debate, a proposal that allows citizens to allocate 
funds might better promote their influence and their exercise of associational 
freedoms.274  Employing a process similar to cumulative voting,275 citizens of 
color could strategically concentrate resources behind one candidate or issue 
that is particularly important to them,276 or spread resources out among a 
variety of candidates or issues.  Legislators from predominantly white 
communities would have greater incentives to consider the claims of those in 
predominantly minority communities.277  Granted, scenarios exist in which 
direct government allocation of public funds to candidates would seem 
preferable, such as when a candidate of color has difficulty collecting funds 
from a predominantly white population.  On the whole, however, a system 
that allows voters to allocate funds might be better because it empowers 
 
or initiative on the ballot in any election held within the United States.”); Hasen, supra note 39, at 
20–27 (arguing for a voucher system of campaign finance reform).  Hasen describes his plan as: 
[A] new system of campaign finance that should appeal to those on the left and the 
right: a plan for mandatory campaign finance vouchers that supplants, rather than 
supplements, our current campaign finance system. Under this plan, each voter would 
have the opportunity to contribute vouchers to candidates or to interest groups in every 
federal election cycle. The interest groups would use the vouchers to contribute to 
candidates or to organize independent expenditure campaigns. With limited exceptions, 
only funds from the voucher system could be spent to support or oppose candidates for 
elected federal offices. 
Id. at 5. 
274. Cf. Hasen, supra note 39, at 46–47 (“Indeed, all direct public financing plans, whether 
level-up or level-down, fail to facilitate the representation of the poor and unorganized. These plans 
tend to insulate candidates from the political influence of all groups. . . .  Direct public financing 
will not encourage politicians to seek out the support of underrepresented groups. . . .  Those groups 
with greater organizational ability, particularly groups which can get out the vote, will fare best.  
Politics under a public financing regime, then, would look very much like the politics of today.”). 
275. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 149 (1994) (noting that politically cohesive minority groups may 
achieve better representation under a system in which “each voter is given the same number of votes 
as open seats, and the voter may plump or cumulate her votes to reflect the intensity of her 
preferences”). 
276. See Hasen, supra note 39, at 35 (“Another significant advantage of the voucher plan as an 
intensity-registering mechanism is that it allows people with strong feelings about particular issues 
to ‘plump’ all of their support behind a single group or candidate, thereby having greater impact on 
that issue.”). 
277. In a similar spirit, Professor Ford would open local elections so that voting is not limited 
on the basis of municipal residence.  See Ford, supra note 84, at 1909–10 (“[Local elections should] 
not be limited on the basis of residence, but instead would be open to all members of a metropolitan 
region. . . .  [V]oters would receive a number of votes equal to the number of open seats, which they 
could cast in any election they wished.  Hence voters would effectively draw their own 
jurisdictional boundaries, decide which local governments were most important to them, and 
allocate their votes accordingly.”).  One could argue that campaign finance contributions give 
Americans the opportunity to congregate with one another.  Geography, especially in an age of 
desegregation, is an insufficient political grouping, and contributions allow individuals with similar 
perspectives to associate with one another.  The current privately financed system limits this form of 
association to a population that is overwhelmingly white and male.  Allowing for citizen allocation 
of public funds to particular candidates would extend this same freedom to all Americans. 
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citizens of color, as well as other Americans, with the opportunities to give 
contributions currently enjoyed by wealthy contributors.  Rather than relying 
on government to assign public funds to groups and candidates, such a 
system might better allow people of color and other citizens to identify 
themselves with groups, movements, or candidates.278 
Note however, that even with a public-financing program that limits 
private contributions and expenditures, those who have benefited from past 
discrimination would still have disproportionate influence over the political 
process.  For example, wealthier whites would still disproportionately own 
and control newspapers and television news operations that cover and ex-
plicitly endorse candidates.279  Further, those who have profited from past 
discrimination could still purchase airtime to promote general political issues 
and would still own and control most recording companies and movie 
studios, factors which allow for disproportionate influence over public 
opinion and which could impact election results.280  The relevant question, 
however, is not whether a regulatory scheme is completely impenetrable, but 
whether it provides a barrier that is sufficiently great to reduce the number of 
 
278. See Minow, supra note 8, at 683, 683–87 (observing that “one of the problems behind 
identity politics is the assignment of individuals by government or powerful actors to groups beyond 
their own control or choice,” and proposing that an “alternative worth exploring is governmental 
structures that permit people to identify themselves in temporary groups for specific purposes”); cf. 
Foley, supra note 36, at 1255 (“As [Bruce] Ackerman observes, ‘special-interest’ electoral 
organizations play an important role in this kind of electoral process. . . .  As long as the money that 
special-interest groups spend on electoral activities is derived entirely from donations from voters 
(all of whom have equal electoral funds pursuant to the equal-dollars-per-voter principle), there is 
nothing objectionable about the degree of influence these special-interest groups may have upon 
candidates.”). 
279. Cf. Arthur N. Eisenberg, Buckley, Rupert Murdoch, and the Pursuit of Equality in the 
Conduct of Elections, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 451, 460 (“Once you allow Rupert Murdoch to 
spend as much as he chooses to support or oppose candidates . . . the entire regime of spending 
limits begins to unravel.”); Joel Gora, Campaign Finance Reform: Still Searching for a Better Way, 
6 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 153 (1997) (“Why can Rupert Murdoch ‘drown out’ Ruth Messinger, but 
George Soros is not permitted to help her out?”); L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First 
Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 267–68 (observing that newspapers and television stations 
are specifically excluded from the limits on expenditures made on behalf of candidates that accept 
public funding, and thus the limits are underinclusive because wealthy media owners can reach 
many voters, but others will not be able to band together for the same purpose). 
280. Courts should not necessarily solve this problem by deferring to regulation of the media 
and money that is spent on expression that shapes public opinion and indirectly impacts election 
outcomes.  First of all, there may be good reasons not to allow regulation of these other activities, as 
articulated in subpart IV(C).  Second, regardless of where one draws the line between activities that 
can and cannot be regulated, difficult border cases are likely to exist in which individuals engage in 
unregulated activities to circumvent regulation.  Cf. Baker, supra note 203, at 48 (“Under any 
conception of elections, line drawing will be necessary.  Theory can only identify important 
considerations.  It cannot give complete guidance for this pragmatic task.  Even if theory specifies 
an acceptable rationale for putting items on one or the other side of the line, difficult cases are 
inevitable.”). 
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attempts at circumvention to justify the cost of the regulation.281  Despite the 
ability of a few to circumvent the public-financing proposal described above, 
it is likely that noncompliance would be sufficiently uncommon to at least 
reduce the effects of racial disparities in wealth on political participation. 
C. The “Colorblind Card” 
Some might assert that a racial analysis of campaign finance runs 
against the Court’s increasingly “colorblind” approach to the law.  Those 
who oppose the consideration of race as a legitimate analytical tool might 
argue that judges applying the “colorblind” principle in equal-protection 
jurisprudence would strictly scrutinize all race-based decisions, regardless of 
whether they benefit whites or communities of color.282  Strict scrutiny likely 
applies, the argument goes, even to a decision that is racially neutral in form 
but enacted in light of implications for racial minorities.283  Opponents might 
distinguish the consideration of race from economic and class-based 
considerations that implicate minimal judicial scrutiny.284 
The Supreme Court, however, has never stated that legislatures should 
not consider the racial implications of a particular measure.  While the Court 
has stated that race should not be the “predominant” factor in a governmental 
 
281. See Pildes & Schauer, supra note 215, at 1830 (“The measure of a lock is not the bipolar 
question of whether it is successful by keeping out everyone or unsuccessful by keeping out no one, 
but rather the scalar question of whether the barrier is sufficiently great, or the cost sufficiently high, 
to reduce the number of transgressions by enough to justify the cost of the barrier.”). 
282. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that strict 
scrutiny will be applied to all racial classifications regardless of the race of those burdened or 
benefited); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506–08 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(striking down a municipal plan for race-based minority set-asides of city construction contracts in 
part because the plan was not “narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination”). 
283. Justice Scalia has urged the Court to embrace a more stringent color-blindness concept that 
would prohibit all race-conscious measures apart from remedies for identified victims of 
discrimination.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 941 
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Nation’s profound commitment to 
the ideal of racial equality . . . refuses to permit the State to act on the premise that racial differences 
matter.”). 
284. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Getting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based 
Compromise, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 724–25 (1996) (“Those wedded to racial preferences on the 
merits need to explore the class preference alternative as a matter of legal and political 
necessity. . . .  [I]nstances of racial classifications surviving strict scrutiny are extremely rare.  By 
contrast, ‘class’ preferences are constitutionally unassailable.”); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis 
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 
1, 32 (“[T]he impact of eliminating racial preference is easily exaggerated.  The preferred groups 
[who would benefit from affirmative action] could be redefined as the underprivileged, the 
deprived, etc.—classifications not based upon race or ethnic origin. The constitutional objection to 
preferential treatment would thereby be removed, without substantial impairment of the purposes of 
such treatment.”); J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 509 (observing that “the city has at its disposal a 
whole array of race-neutral devices to increase the accessibility of city contracting opportunities to 
small entrepreneurs of all races”). 
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decision, it has been careful to note that this guideline does not mean that 
government can never take race into account.285  Unfortunately, perhaps the 
most significant problem with the emerging “colorblind” jurisprudence is 
that it has a chilling effect on the consideration of racial implications of 
facially race-neutral laws.  The Court, however, has recognized the im-
portance of the consideration of race in the construction of political processes 
in its jurisprudence interpreting the Voting Rights Act.286 
Some might argue that, even if the consideration of race is con-
stitutionally permissible, the best way to eliminate racial disparities is by 
creating a colorblind state.287  Explicit racial considerations cause symbolic 
or expressive harms,288 the argument goes, and simply entrench Balkanized 
politics.289  A race-conscious state, one might assert, undermines the pos-
sibility of the eventual transformation of America into a “colorblind” society 
by encouraging private individuals and institutions to think in racial terms.290  
 
285. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (noting that judicial deference to a 
district drawn by the political branches may be appropriate in situations in which “the voting 
population is one in which race and political affiliation are highly correlated”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (“This Court has never held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is 
impermissible in all circumstances.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1039, 1049 (1998) (observing that “while holding that it is impermissible to disadvantage a 
person on the basis of race, the Court has never said that it is impermissible to take race into account 
in government policymaking”). 
286. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (“Strict scrutiny does not apply merely 
because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race. . . .  Nor does it apply to all cases of 
intentional creation of majority-minority districts.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) 
(“Redistricting legislatures will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not 
follow that race predominates in the redistricting process.”).  One might note that the Voting Rights 
Act is unique in that courts have acknowledged that legislatures may use demographic data such as 
age, race, and political affiliation when drawing voting district.  But, as asserted previously, 
campaign finance rules are no less important than district lines in shaping the racial distribution of 
political power; legislatures should be free in both situations to consider the context-specific 
obstacles that operate to exclude people of color from the political process. 
287. See William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the 
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809 (1979) (“[W]e shall not see racism disappear by 
employing its own ways of classifying people and of measuring their rights,” and asserting that “one 
gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment 
never to tolerate . . . the differential treatment of other human beings by race.”). 
288. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (“Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm 
to our society.  They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that 
individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.”); Brown, 479 U.S. at 941–42 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“That the Court will not tolerate prosecutors’ racially 
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, in effect, is a special rule of relevance, a statement 
about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact.”); Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 
1520 (2000) (“On the rights and equality side of constitutional law, [expressive] theories assert that 
state action is required to express the appropriate attitudes toward persons.”). 
289. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 (“Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a 
political system in which race no longer matters.”). 
290. See id. at 648 (asserting that “a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of 
racial bloc voting that majority-minority [legislative] districting is sometimes said to counteract”). 
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Once race consciousness is morally promoted as a social or legal norm, it 
becomes more difficult to disavow. 
A racial analysis, however, is not equivalent to what some would 
describe as “playing the race card.”  A consideration of race is not a rigid 
rule which, when employed, trumps all other considerations.  In contrast, 
those who play the “colorblind card” mechanically and irrationally silence 
discussion of relevant issues.  Indeed, the seemingly neutral argument against 
recognizing race is likely to suppress the concerns of racial minorities and 
prevent change.291 
Granted, American history is often painful.  We cannot live in the past, 
and sometimes it may seem best to forget some incidents.  But lawmaking 
and the interpretation of law are sufficiently important to warrant that judges 
and legislators rise to the task of making decisions in light of history.292  By 
focusing on whether a decision tends to reaffirm or exacerbate past 
discrimination, a consideration of race keeps America’s unique history at the 
forefront of the equation and ensures that important decisions are made in the 
proper context. 
VI. Conclusion 
The consideration of political realities related to race moves the 
campaign finance debate toward improved jurisprudence and toward more 
inclusive reforms in a number of ways.  First, a racial framework makes 
critiques of current jurisprudence more salient and powerful.  While 
Reformers highlight the unfairness of politics based on uneven distributions 
of property, they fail to question the legitimacy of those distributions.  A 
privately financed campaign system that adopts the existing property 
entitlements as a baseline of political power resuscitates and exacerbates the 
effects of past discriminatory laws.  The current campaign finance system’s 
reinforcement of racial hierarchies that arose from deliberate state-sponsored 
discrimination is at least as troubling as the system’s reinforcement of class-
based hierarchies. 
Second, the lens of race exposes the Reformers’ oversight of historical 
realities related to racial exclusion from the political process, a pressing 
 
291. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 9 (1990) (“[S]ome 
philosophers and policymakers even refuse to acknowledge the reality of social groups, a denial that 
often reinforces group oppressions.”); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., The Woody Allen Blues: 
“Identity Politics,” Race, and the Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 511, 523 (1999) (“Ultimately, these attacks 
on the identity of those who are seeking political change about what is fair and equal is an effort to 
prevent change.”). 
292. Cf. Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 915, 1013 (1998) (observing that “the Court will never face any of these difficult 
questions if it pretermits consideration of such issues with the simplistic invocation of the 
individualistic equality mandated by indiscriminate application of the Court’s color-blind vision”). 
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problem in American democracy.  While important correlations between race 
and class exist, the two are not synonymous, and some reform proposals 
contain provisions that can be said to hamper efforts to include people of 
color in the political process.  The reform project will never succeed in 
addressing its concerns regarding the quality of campaign discourse, 
legitimacy of government, and widespread participation in democracy if it 
ignores the context-specific costs and benefits of its reform proposals.  In 
order to solidify their claims within the historical and contemporary realities 
of politics, Reformers must engage in a more sophisticated analysis and craft 
reforms that promote meaningful and effective participation for all 
Americans, including people of color. 
Finally, a racial analysis reveals that campaign finance may provide an 
additional tool to help diminish racial disparities in society generally.  A 
more equitable democratic environment allows people of color to use the 
political process to secure privileges and resources for themselves.293  Some 
facially race-neutral campaign finance reforms crafted after a consideration 
of race may enhance the ability of people of color to improve their conditions 
through participation in the political process.  These reforms may be less 
vulnerable to criticisms articulated against affirmative action, reparations, 
race-based redistricting, and other race-specific remedial devices. 
Campaign finance reform that diminishes the political disadvantages 
currently faced by people of color supplies an important step toward 
improving democratic dialogue and redressing racial harms.  A more 
comprehensive understanding of campaign finance requires the integration of 
race as an important analytical consideration. 
 
293. Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good 
citizens, we must live.”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (noting that the political 
franchise “is regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights”). 
